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LEGAL PHENOMENA, KNOWLEDGE, AND THEORY: A
CAUTIONARY TALE OF HEDGEHOGS AND FOXES*
RONALD J. ALLEN** & Ross M. ROSENBERG***

INTRODUCTION

Our thesis: A portion, perhaps a substantial portion, of legal theory, and thus derivatively much of what passes for legal knowledge,
systematically misconceives the nature of the legal phenomena
(human interactions and the resultant legal regulation) under
investigation and thus generates false conclusions. Alternatively: A
portion of legal scholarship mismodels the phenomena under
investigation, with untoward results as judged by the accuracy of the
explanations or predictions generated by the model.,
Some portion of legal scholarship and legal theorizing involves
the articulation of general theoretical approaches to legal regulation
of human interactions. Many of these theories are top-down theories
meant to apply deductively to phenomena within their domain. We
are presently indifferent to the size of this portion, although there is
reason to believe it is substantial.2 Frequently, and again we are
* SIR ISAIAH BERLIN, THE HEDGEHOG AND THE Fox (1953), noted the difference
between intellectual hedgehogs, who relate everything to single organizing principles, and
intellectual foxes, who pursue many unrelated and contradictory ends.
** John Henry Wigmore Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law. We
are indebted to Jaime Jarvill, Ian Logan, Brian Nolan, and William Rohner for their superb
research assistance. We also are indebted to Craig Callen and Richard Posner for their
comments on an earlier draft, and to the participants at workshops at Emory University,
Washington University, University of Texas, University of San Diego, and the Chicago-Kent
College of Law Symposium on Negligence.
*** J.D. Northwestern University, 1999; Associate, Sullivan & Cromwell.
1. Because of the untoward results, we do not need to deal directly with Milton
Friedman's well-known description of the role false assumptions play in useful models. MILTON

FRIEDMAN, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 3-46

(1953); see also George R. Boyer & Robert S. Smith, The Development of the Neoclassical
Tradition in Labor Economics, 54 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 199 (2001).
2. See, e.g., LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 94-100

(1996); Frank Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust. 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 11 (1984); Harry T.
Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91
MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992); Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal
Education and the Legal Profession: A Postscript, 91 MICH. L. REV. 2191 (1993) [hereinafter
Postscript]: Richard A. Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory. 111 HARV. L.
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indifferent to how frequently, these general top-down theories are
advanced as explanations of, or ordering mechanisms for, particular
legal regulation. The theorizing also may be intended to, and perhaps
does, influence the evolution of the legal regulation. This Article
analyzes the susceptibility of legal regulation of differing types of
human interaction to being organized or explained by top-down
deductive theories of general applicability. We concentrate on two
related examples: the Learned Hand theory of negligence and the
microeconomic approach to Sherman Act antitrust claims. Numerous
additional examples are at hand ranging from the grand jurisprudential theories of Ronald Dworkin or Joseph Raz, to the equally
ambitious economic theories of Richard Posner and Stephen Shavell
and the ambitious challenges to them from behavioral economics, to
mid-level theories offered as "reconceptualizations" of some more
modest slice of the legal pie.3
We think that there is reason to believe that some portion of
these theoretical efforts generate false conclusions4 because of the
incompatibility between the nature of the legal phenomena under
consideration and the analytical tool of the generalized, top-down
theory. 5 Moreover, we think we can identify some of the aspects of
legal phenomena that determine, in part, their amenability to
differing kinds of analyses. We make no claim that we have a
complete taxonomy of the attributes of legal phenomena; we do
believe we can identify some of their critical aspects, however, and
REV. 1637 (1998) (revised and published as a book in 1999); G. Edward White, The Unexpected
Persistence of Negligence 1980-2000, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1337, 1361 (2001).
3. For examples of this latter sin, one might consult Ronald J. Allen, StructuringJury
Decisionmaking in CriminalCases: A Unified ConstitutionalApproach to Evidentiary Devices,
94 HARV. L. REV. 321 (1980); Ronald J. Allen, A Reconceptualization of Civil Trials, 66 B.U. L.
REV. 401 (1986).

4. We are not claiming that all efforts at legal theorizing generate false results, and we
presently are not able to estimate what proportion does. That is not the burden of this Article
in any event. The burden of this Article is to lay out a potentially fruitful way of thinking about
legal knowledge.
5. The complex relationship between top-down, deductive theory and the phenomenon
being theorized about has been analyzed most in depth in the field of evidence with respect to
the implications of Bayes' Theorem for the evidentiary process at trial. See, e.g., Ronald J.
Allen, Rationality, Algorithms and JuridicalProof A Preliminary Inquiry, I INT'L J. EVID. &
PROOF 254 (1997); see also Ronald J. Allen, Clarifying the Burden of Persuasionand Bayesian
Decision Rules: A Response to Professor Kaye, 4 INT'L J. EVID. & PROOF 246 (2000); David H.
Kaye, Bayes, Burdens and Base Rates, 4 INT'L J. EVID. & PROOF 260 (2000). The theoretical
chaos of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has been examined from a similar perspective.
Ronald J. Allen & Ross M. Rosenberg, The FourthAmendment and the Limits of Theory: Local
Versus General Theoretical Knowledge, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1190 (1998). These earlier works
did not identify nor attempt to test the variables that may determine the utility of top-down
theories, as the present work does.
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that we can demonstrate some of their implications. In particular, at
least three variables seem to be consistently at play with respect to
legal phenomena: ambiguity, unpredictability, and common sense.
By "ambiguity" we mean that the true state of the law is ambiguous at the time of decision; that it does not literally come into
being until a decision is reached.6 There is a gap, and perhaps it is
accurate to say that the relevant law does not exist. Gaps are
plausibly ubiquitous in the law. Every "reasonableness" standard is a
potential occasion of ambiguity, of a case in which a significant
portion, if not the entire relevant standard, is not known in advance.
Negligence is thus a possible example of ambiguity in the law, and
one to which we return later. Tax regulations seem to identify
another example. As fast as the regulations are churned out, tax
lawyers concoct avoidance mechanisms, one plausible explanation of
which may be ambiguity. Antitrust regulation, by contrast, may not
involve as much ambiguity as negligence due to the dominant role of
economic theory in dictating a standard of decision and a measure for
lawful competition, and again we return to this example below.
The common law is, in a sense, a formalized means of dealing
with gaps in the existing regulation of behavior by creating law out of
a vacuum. Much the same is true of administrative law, statutory
interpretation, and constitutional law. In virtually every legal field,
the application of case law or statutes to an unanticipated problem is
commonplace. What sense can be given to the notion of applying the
intent of the drafters to wiretapping, for example? Not even Ben
Franklin, as he was flying his kites in rough weather, was thinking of
electronic surveillance. Although some might deny that the law has
gaps, we think it is plain that it does. Perhaps the Dworkinian claim
(not obviously held by Dworkin himself) is less that the law has gaps,
and more that when it does they should be filled in a particular way. 7
This brings us to the second aspect of legal phenomena, unpredictability.
6. Although our view is that much of the law is "objective" in one sense or another,
nothing much turns on the matter for this Article. It does matter if the law is knowable. Much
has been said on the objectivity of the law. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin. Objectivity and Truth:
You'd Better Believe It, 25 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 87 (1996); KENT GREENAWALT, LAW AND
OBJECTIVITY (1992); LAW AND INTERPRETATION: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (Andrei
Marmor ed., 1995); LAW, INTERPRETATION AND REALITY: ESSAYS IN EPISTEMOLOGY.

HERMENEUTICS, AND JURISPRUDENCE (Patrick Nerhot ed., 1990). We also do not see that we
are committed to any particular perspective on justice. See generally JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL
LIBERALISM (1993).

7. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986).

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol, 77:683

By "unpredictability" we mean computational intractability. By
computationally intractability, we mean not only problems that
cannot possibly be computed in real time,8 but also problems that
realistically defy human computational capacity for whatever reason.
Some problems have formal solutions, but the solutions are so
complicated that they could not realistically be computed. A simple
example of this kind of complexity is chess. Every move in chess is
formally determined; there is no known ambiguity as we previously
defined it. Moreover, there are at any one time relatively few moves
that can be made. There are only twenty possible opening moves,
and only twenty possible responses. However, the possible combinations of moves increase algorithmically. For example, there are
twenty times twenty, or four hundred, combinations of the first two
moves, and it all goes downhill ("uphill" probably better captures the
point) at an increasing rate (the number of possible moves increases).
For all the increases in computer speed, it remains true that all the
possible combinations of chess moves cannot be computed in real
time, which is why a computer has beaten a grand master in a match
but one time (and there is some doubt about the fairness of that
match).9 Computers compute and humans think, which are related,
but different functions.'
In this one small area, with a limited
number of variables, only recently has formal computational capacity
begun to substitute for whatever it is that expert chess players do in
addition to computation. We think there is evidence indicating that
the difference between computation and thought is relevant to legal
regulation in predictable ways.
Much of life is considerably more complicated than chess. If it is
complicated because no formal rules apply, then it is ambiguous in
our terms. If formal rules apply, often the implications of those rules
will be computationally intractable in the manner we just explained.
Perhaps negligence involves ambiguity in the sense that the parameters of a community's standards may not be knowable in advance of
decision. Maybe they are," however, in which case computational
8. See generally Allen & Rosenberg, supra note 5.
9. For example. Kasporov was denied access to any previous games played by Big Blue,
whereas the IBM team could study Kasporov's prior games. All of this is detailed on various
web cites, such as http://whyfiles.org/040chess/. It should be noted as well that IBM declined a
rematch on Kasporov's conditions (disclosing prior games, for example).
10. There are substantial complexities here. of course.
11. If formal rules, the basis of decision, or the criteria to be employed are not knowable in
advance, nothing but banal top-down theories can explain legal decision making (e.g., "The
judge decides as he pleases.").
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intractability will be an issue. How does one accommodate ("compute") the views of the approximately seven million people in the
greater Chicago area, for example? By contrast, whether some
arrangement is anticompetitive (to return to the antitrust example)
may be comparatively straightforward (which is not to say it is simple
on some absolute scale). If ambiguity, unpredictability, or both,
characterize or suffuse an area of law, we predict that formal topdown theories will be relatively uninformative about the area.
The third variable that bears upon the regulation of legal phenomena is whether something is amenable to common-sense understanding or instead requires specialized knowledge to comprehend.2
Negligence and antitrust regulation again provide useful examples. If
negligence means something captured by either reasonableness or
community standards, it does not typically require expertise to
identify or apply to the facts of a case. To identify anticompetitive
practices, by contrast, plausibly requires a grounding in economics
beyond that held by a large portion of the public.
As our examples of negligence and antitrust regulation imply, we
think these three variables-ambiguity, unpredictability and
common-sense reasoning-determine to a significant extent the
explanatory power and usefulness of top-down, generalized theories
to legal phenomena. 3 We hypothesize that top-down theories
increase in utility as the relevant legal phenomena decrease in
ambiguity, unpredictability, and the amenability to common-sense
reasoning. As these variables go in the opposite direction, with
ambiguity and unpredictability increasing, and the need for specialized knowledge decreasing, we predict that top-down theories of the
12. We mean by "common sense" not just the collection of conventional biases but at least
the elaborated meaning contained in the work of LYND FORGUSON, COMMON SENSE (1989).
See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen, Common Sense, Rationality, and the Legal Process, 22 CARDOzO L.

REV. 1417, 1423-24 (2001); see also Brian Grant, The Virtues of Common Sense, 76
PHILOSOPHY 191 (2001). We thus see common sense as different from public or popular
opinion. Argumentative appeals to popular opinion have long been viewed as logically
fallacious, leading some to view it as substantively misguided reliance on collections of myths
and superstitions.

See, e.g., IRVING M. COPI & CARL COHEN, INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC

91-107 (8th ed. 1990). This has, in part, fueled scientism within some legal circles, but
unfortunately appeals to authority are just as much logically flawed. Id. at 95-96. For
interesting and thorough treatments of these two topics, see the two books by DOUGLAS N.
WALTON, APPEAL TO POPULAR OPINION (1999) and APPEAL TO EXPERT OPINION (1997).

13. Our hypothesis thus differs from the conventional argument over common-sense
reasoning and pragmatism. We are trying to determine whether the variables that lead to
common sense and algorithmic approaches can be identified; we are not claiming that legal
theory is, whole-hog, futile or useless. For a general discussion of the argument from
pragmatism, see David E. Van Zandt, An Alternative Theory of PracticalReason in Judicial
Decisions,65 TUL. L. REV. 775 (1991).
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standard legal academic sort will prove less valuable. We make no
claim here about the interactions of these variables, in particular of
the relationship between ambiguity and unpredictability on the one
hand and common-sense reasoning on the other. Perhaps they are
independent, perhaps not.14
In the remainder of this Article, we test our hypothesis in the
following two ways. First, we predict that courts and legislatures will
systematically ignore theoretical legal scholarship precisely because it
often fails to account for the nature of the legal phenomenon
supposedly under investigation.5 The analytical tools entailed by
top-down theorizing brought to the task of explicating legal phenomena are often not suited to it, in other words. We provide evidence
supporting this prediction that shows the astonishing disparity in the
citations to academic work among academics as compared to citations
to the same work by courts or references to it in legislative histories.
There is an abundance of evidence that even the academic work of
the theoretical giants of the law, such as Dworkin and Posner, is
virtually ignored by the vast majority of individuals and institutions
that create and enforce the law. By contrast, courts have cited the
work of the doctrinalists, such as Corbin, Wigmore, and Wright,
hundreds of thousands of times.
Perhaps this first test of our thesis misses the manner in which
advances in legal knowledge get assimilated by the system as a
whole.' 6 Perhaps it is not through engagement with the primary
sources themselves but instead through the inculcation of new ideas
in the minds of law students, or through exposure at conferences and
the like, that the judiciary and the legislature become swayed by
academic theory.
Perhaps, but this, too, we think is subject to testing. The microeconomic explanations of negligence and antitrust have existed for
roughly the same length of time, and thus have had similar opportunities to work their way indirectly into the law. If anything, the
microeconomic explanation of negligence has had a greater opportu-

14. We also are not making any essentialist claims that legal phenomena necessarily have
certain attributes. We are analyzing what we observe under present circumstances.
15. We make no prediction about whether any legal scholar cares about this, or whether
the lack of citation is a badge of honor in some fashion.
16. For a useful discussion of the institutional factors that may structure the absorption of
economics into antitrust law, see William E. Kovacic. The Influence of Economics on Antitrust
Law, 30 ECON. INQUIRY 294 (1992).
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nity, as apparently more students study torts than antitrust.7 We
predict, however, that the impact of microeconomics on negligence
and antitrust will vary considerably. Negligence involves highly
ambiguous and unpredictable matters because it ranges over virtually
all of human affairs. Moreover, if it involves reasonableness as
conventionally understood, it does not require any specialized
knowledge to identify or apply; common sense is typically all it takes.
Therefore, we predict that the law of negligence will be largely
oblivious to the microeconomic analysis. By contrast, antitrust
involves a much smaller slice of human affairs than negligence (as
complicated as the economy is, the economy is a subset of human
interactions), is reducible to a smaller set of variables, and requires
some expertise to grasp. Thus, we predict that antitrust law will show
considerably greater colonization by economics than negligence law.
Since both areas have had a considerable time to be colonized by the
students of the proponents of these ideas, this provides a natural test
of whether our citation analysis misconceives how legal knowledge is
disseminated. In sum, our data show striking differences between
these two fields.
Perhaps the problem is not with theoretical top-down theories of
negligence but with the microeconomic theory of negligence.
Negligence has inspired numerous current theories, and perhaps one
of those has succeeded where microeconomics has failed. This is a
more difficult issue to test, but there is at least some evidence. That
evidence shows that instructions on negligence have remained stable
over an extended period, indicating a general indifference to academic discourse.18
Even if instructions have remained stable, perhaps courts of appeals fashion negligence cases to fit the economic mold. We give
good reason to doubt this by comparing the treatment of negligence
in Illinois and a state that has explicitly adopted the economic
approach, Louisiana.
First, we present our citation data, which can be done quite succinctly. We then turn to negligence. We review our understanding of
the debates over the nature of negligence, and then present the data
17. We base this assumption on the fact that torts is generally and maybe universally a
required law school course, while antitrust is not.
18. Other areas of tort law may have different implications. That, of course, is part of our
point. In any event, evidence exists of the effect of scholars on workmen's compensation
legislation, strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities, defective products, and "no-fault"
automobile accident compensation. See White. supra note 2. at 1342.
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indicating the general irrelevance of that debate for the courts and for
the jury instructions in typical negligence-based torts actions.19 We
then look at a series of Illinois Supreme Court cases dealing with
negligence, searching for some sign of a systematic economic
approach, of which there is essentially none. We compare the Illinois
cases with negligence jurisprudence in Louisiana, for Louisiana seems
to be the one state that has adopted the economic approach to
negligence. The significance of the Louisiana cases is that they show
judges are capable of employing the economic approach directly, thus
suggesting that those who do not-the rest of the nation, basically-are doing so because of choice rather than necessity. Last, we
present the results of a comparative search for the impact of microeconomics on antitrust law and find a different picture.
I.

COMPARATIVE CITATIONS BY ACADEMICS, JUDGES, AND
LEGISLATORS

There are claims for the significance of legal theory,Z0 and there
is also much bemoaning of the irrelevance of legal scholarship.21 One
obvious source of data bearing on this disagreement is citation
practices by judges and references in legislative history. If the legal
theorists have an impact, their work plausibly would appear in the
work product of the legal system. It doesn't.
We have examined the relationship between citations in law reviews and citations by judges and legislators in legislative records. 22
There is no direct relationship between the two that we can find;
indeed, the relationship may be inverse.23 The renowned theoreticians who get thousands of citations in the legal literature, including
perhaps the two giants of modern American legal theory, Posner and
Dworkin, received relatively few citations in cases or legislative
reports (excluding Posner's judicial opinions, of course). Through
July 2000, Posner's academic work gathered close to 9,000 citations in
law reviews, but only 628 in cases. Dworkin received, by our count,
about 4,000 citations in law reviews, and 87 in the cases. Other legal
19. Of course, litigation and regulation are different, but one must start somewhere.
20.

Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process, 107 YALE L.J.

1535, 1649-50 (1998): see also Posner. supra note 2.
21. See Edwards, supra note 2: Postscript. supra note 2.
22. Others have looked into this issue as well. See William M. Landes & Richard R.
Posner. The Influence of Economics on Law: A Quantitative Study. 36 J.L. & ECON. 385 (1993).

23. We say "may" because we have not checked for citations of the doctrinalists in
academic work, as we are indifferent to what it shows.
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heavy hitters fared similarly. Cas Sunztein received approximately
5,000 citations in law reviews, but only 227 in cases. Richard Delgado
had been cited in law reviews over 2,000 times, and in cases only 4
times.24 Both Catherine MacKinnon and Jack Balkin had been cited
in law reviews close to a 1,000 times each, but received only scattered
cites in cases (MacKinnon 12, and Balkin 3). This is as we would
predict.
Also consistent with our thesis, the single most cited authority
for an argument that we have been able to identify is common
sense.2 5 The words and phrases "common sense," "commonsensical,"
and "sensible," used as an argument (based on a crude sampling26),
appear upwards of 70,000 times in WESTLAW.27 And again
consistent with our thesis, the only close competitors that we have
been able to identify are treatises. Wright & Miller is cited about
35,000 times. Wigmore is next with about 22,000 cites, Corbin gets
about 1,000, and almost no one who is or was not an established
treatise writer gets more than 100.28 This is not because law reviews
are not cited. Cases cite treatises and law reviews hundreds of

24. We gathered the citation data from standard WESTLAW searches. However, we
could not create a computer search methodology that permitted us perfectly accurately to sort
things such as people with the same surname but different first names. In the legal literature,
we searched for first and last names, and excluded all the first and last names that might
confound the study (such as Gerald Dworkin and Victor Posner). This would result in
underestimating the number of academic citations. Another problem was sorting out citations
to Posner's cases from citations to his academic work. So, we checked each judicial citation
individually to confirm the numbers. We tried no similar strategy with academic citations since
the numbers were overwhelming, and our only interest is in the magnitudes. So. case citations
should be accurate as of the date we did the work, and the legal citations may be low, but the
magnitudes are accurate. In any event, the possible direction of the error would be detrimental
to our argument.
25. Surely precedent would topple even common sense. We just could not come up with
an efficient method of getting a count of case citations as authority, but William M. Landes &
Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and EmpiricalAnalysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249
(1976), provides evidence that this is correct.
26. We generated a list and looked at them in an ad hoc way. Virtually all references to
"common sense" and related terms employ them as arguments. Again, what matters here is the
magnitude. and if anything our number is probably low. See supra note 24.
27. This almost surely grossly understates the reliance on common sense as an argument.
for the concept is often invoked in different terms. For example, in Balderos v. City Chevrolet.
214 F.3d 849, 854 (7th Cir. 2000), Judge Posner disposed of one legal contention by arguing: "If
there were such a relationship it would mean that the buyer could tell the dealer to shop the
retail sales contract among finance companies and to disclose the various offers the dealer
obtained to him, and no one dealing with an automobile dealer expects that kind of service."
No one with common sense, in any event.
28. Believing our point was satisfactorily made, we did not check other treatises, such as
Moore's Federal Practice. We also did not check the extent to which treatises are cited by legal
academics, as our thesis is indifferent to that.
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thousands of times.29 They just don't cite what passes for high theory

very much. Perhaps the zenith of the neglect of the legal academy, or
nadir depending upon your point of view, are the cases of Vacco v.
Quill30 and Washington v. Glucksberg,31 in which the Supreme Court
held that state bans on assisted suicide do not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment. A distinguished group of American philosophers32
wrote an amicus brief to the contrary (this being perhaps the only

issue on which they have agreed in quite some time), which the Court
did not even mention in reaching its unanimously opposite conclusion. 33
Some legislative history is available online.34 We have searched
this as well, and again can find virtually no signs that the grand
theorists are having a noticeable impact on legislation. A few
scholars are politically active and appear as witnesses or provide
29. As discussed in the text, treatises are cited a couple hundred thousand times
themselves. However, determining the number of times legal materials are cited is not
determinable except by manual search. Computer searches generate case hits but do not
disclose how many times within a case a source is cited. Getting an accurate number of cases
that have cited legal materials is also challenging because virtually all search terms generate
false positives. We thus enlisted the assistance of Marcia Lehr, the Reference Librarian at
Northwestern University School of Law to help us gain an approximation of the number of
cases citing to law reviews. She tested various search terms and checked them for accuracy.
Despite careful construction of this search and much trial and error, there were some false hits.
After removing from the search the terms causing the most false hits, the amount of false hits
was small. However, truly problematic search terms had to be removed even though they would
have also generated many legitimate hits. These include, for example: ("B.J."), ("B. J."),
Criminology, Briefcase, Antitrust, Litigation, Taxes, Trial, etc. Thus, the number of hits
generated is a substantially low approximation. In any event, the following search was done in
the WESTLAW ALLCASES database. It had to be run year by year because of the
WESTLAW limitation of reporting no more than 10,000 hits. For the years between and
including 1970 to 2001, the following search yielded 55,908 hits: ("L.Rev.") ("L. Rev.") ("L.J.")
("L. J.") ("L.Q.") ("L. Q.") ("Am. Law.") ("J. Legal") ("Int'l L.") ("Corp. L.") ("J. Int'l") (J/3
Crim.) ("ABA J") ("St. B.J.") ("J. Corp.") (Lab. /3 L.) ("Bus. Law.") ("Transnat'l L.") ("Envt'l
L.") (L /3 Pol'y) (Gender /3 L.) (Sci. /3 L.) (Banking /3 L.) (L. /3 Tech.) (J. /3 Legis.) (Tax'n)
(Contemp.) (L. /3 Social) (L. /3 Arts) (L. /3 Com.) (L. /3 Psychiatry) (L. /3 Econ.) (L /3 Fam.)
(L. /3 Health) ("Tax Notes") ("Hum. Rts.") ("Blackletter J.") ("Disp. Resol.") (Bankr. /3 J.)
and Date (_ ). Again, this is a serious undercount justifying the textual assertion that
treatises and law reviews are cited hundreds of thousands of times. See Deborah Merritt &
Melanie Putnam, Judges and Scholars: Do Courts and Scholarly Journals Cite the Same Law
Review Articles?, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV.871 (1996).

30. 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
31. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
32. Ronald Dworkin, Thomas Nagel, Robert Nozick, John Rawls, Thomas Scanlon, and
Judith Jarvis Thomson.
33. Philosophers generally fare badly with the Court. See Neomi Rao. A Backdoor to
Policy Making: The Use of Philosophers by the Supreme Court, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371,
1373-74 (1998) (finding that only forty-seven Supreme Court cases cited to "major" western
philosophers).
34. We searched in the legislative history congressional reports, congressional testimony,
and state archives databases contained on WESTLAW, and turned up only a scattering of hits.
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written testimony with some frequency, but legislative reports are
bereft of any reliance on legal academic scholarship.35 There are a
few examples of academics directly influencing legislative enactments; the most notable being the Indianapolis ordinance on
pornography, but given the quick demise of that statute, perhaps
these are taken as lessons of perils to avoid rather than examples to
emulate .36
These data are striking. Courts at all levels, and apparently legislators, ignore the theorists, while citing the practitioners. The
judges apparently, and not surprisingly, are looking for answers to
discrete questions, not solutions grounded in grand theory. 37
Moreover, we have begun searching the treatises in particular for
signs of being influenced by the grand theorists. We do not yet
believe we can do this systematically and reliably, but anecdotally
there is not much evidence that we can find indicating that the
treatise writers are under the influence of anyone remotely like (in
relevant respects) Posner, Dworkin, or MacKinnon.38
This absence of evidence of judicial attention is evidence of both
the direct and indirect lack of influence of the theorists on the law. If
the indirect influence theory were correct, there would be some sign
of an increasing effect of the work of the theorists. Posner, Dworkin,
and MacKinnon have surely had no lack of opportunity to promote
their views. If anybody's ideas would slowly seep into legal consciousness through their effect on students or as a result of being
discussed at conferences, it would be theirs. 39
It is, of course, entirely possible that courts cite to precedent instead of top-down theory for a variety of reasons unrelated to the
relative merits of a specific precedent or theory to solve a particular
35. Posner is cited 23 times (and we did not try to determine if any of these were from
testimony as a judge concerning the judiciary, for example); Dworkin is cited 26 times (21 in the
Congressional Record); Sunstein is the winner with 113, which struck us as impressive; Balkin is
cited 3 times; and MacKinnon 2 times.
36. Am. Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut. 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), affd without
opinion, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). For the continuing travails of this academically inspired
legislation, see American Amusement Machine Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572 (7th. Cir. 2001).
37. For an extended discussion of an analogous point, see Allen & Rosenberg, supra note
5.
38. Some of Posner's work can be characterized as a treatise, which causes some
complexities here.
39. There is evidence of social change, of course, of which the movement toward equality
for women and minorities is a good example. We do not have a good answer to how to sort the
cause of general social change of this kind from legal academic writing. We do note, however,
that the legal feminist movement appears to be the result of centuries of social and political
change rather than the cause.
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issue. They may prefer precedent to theory because of institutional,
rule of law, or due process concerns. Citation to precedent is also
such a well-entrenched process that other forms of authority may be
choked off by the practices and culture of courts. Finally, precedent
provides good ideological cover. We personally do not doubt that
courts cite to precedent for these reasons as well as a good many
others. The matter is obviously complex, as the varied literature on
the subject demonstrates.D We recognize that inferences drawn from
citation rates cannot support, by themselves, the conclusion that
courts do not cite top-down theories because many of these theories
are amazingly inaccurate descriptions of the legal problems confronted by courts. There are clearly other reasons that courts fail to
cite top-down legal theory.
There are significant reasons to believe, however, that the inaccuracy of top-down theories is a strong reason that courts ignore
them. The restraints placed upon courts by institutional, rule of law,
or due process concerns do not restrain legislative bodies as tightly or
in the same fashion. The ambit of explicit policy decisions is greater
for legislative bodies, so one would expect that top-down theories
authored by legal scholars would have more sway in legislative
debates. Yet the same pattern of citation practices appears to repeat
itself.41 Moreover, courts cite a variety of authorities that do not
carry the weight of precedent, such as treatises. There appears to be
no great reticence to cite sources outside of traditional case law or
statutory law.
Nor do we think that politics, or simple prejudices, fail to play a
role. Although we find it to be a stretch, it would not be entirely
unreasonable to define broad political beliefs as a species of topdown theories. In this vein, a court's stance on, for example, prosecutorial discretion or health care could be characterized as a form of
general theory. Undoubtedly, such beliefs influence courts, administrative bodies, and legislatures, and admittedly we have not tested for
this in any way. Nevertheless, the patterns of citation practices do not
provide evidence that courts, administrative bodies or legislatures are

40. See, e.g.. Charles Fried, Constitutional Doctrine, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1140, 1142-45
(1994).
41. Again, we have not systematically searched for citations to case precedent and practical
writing in legislative history because we formally are indifferent to the matter. The anecdotal
evidence is overwhelming, however, as even a cursory review of advisory committee notes to
such codifications as the rules of evidence and procedure indicates.
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drawing top-down theories from the standard theoretical work of
academics.
II. THE MEANING OF NEGLIGENCE

Tort scholarship, along with much of the rest of legal scholarship,
is driven by top-down theorizing. The overriding goal appears to be
identifying a simple model or algorithm that "explains" the field.
Two competing camps dominate the contemporary scholarship
addressing the meaning of negligence: the microeconomic theorists
who largely rely on the Learned Hand/Carroll Towing Formula for
their inspiration,42 and corrective justice theorists of one hue or
another.43 Naturally, scholars locate themselves in the spectrum
between these positions, drawing from each in diverse ways.
Significantly, only a few skeptical voices have been raised to this
dominant tendency in the field.
There are, of course, a variety of distinctly different versions of
the Hand formula and corrective justice theory. We will not focus on
the depth of this scholarship except to note several points that are
necessary to evaluating the effect of the Hand formula on courts. To
begin with, the bare bones of the Hand formula is the well-known
relationship posited between the probability of harm, the cost of
harm, and the cost of prevention. This relationship is often referred
to as the "risk-benefit test," "balancing approach," or "cost-benefit
test." 44 As the names imply, any (theoretically) operative version of
this relationship requires, among other things, standards for measuring what does and what does not count as a risk or a benefit. Thus,
whether a court deploys the language of balancing risk against harm
does not necessarily imply that the Hand formula has been deployed
to resolve the case. Rather obviously, assumptions about efficiency
or social welfare, or a variety of other yardsticks, are required.
Without such assumptions, the Hand formula may be a useful way to
evaluate the facts of the case, but it remains something less than a
rule of decision.45 We return to this point when we examine a series
42. See, e.g., Mark F. Grady, Efficient Negligence, 87 GEO. L.J. 397 (1998).
43. See, e.g., Jules Coleman, Moral Theories of Torts: Their Scope and Limits, 2 LAW &
PHIL. 5 (1983): George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537,

537-38 (1972): Ernest J. Weinrib, Thinking About Tort Law, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 717, 718-19
(1992).

44. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 3 cmt. e (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1999).
45. Steven G. Gilles,

On Determining Negligence: Hand Formula Balancing, the

Reasonable Person Standard, and the Jury, 54 VAND. L. REV. 813, 821 (2001) (arguing that "the
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of recent Illinois Supreme Court cases in which balancing risks
against harm plays a role, but by no means a dominant one.
The bare bones of the Hand formula, of course, have a long tradition in American tort law.46 At least since the pioneering work of
Francis Bohlen, American tort scholars have contended that an
important aspect of determining whether an act is negligent is
determining its economic implications. Bohlen was the reporter for
the First Restatement and, in part due to his influence, both the First
and Second Restatements include explicit commentary that invites
courts to determine whether the risks associated with an activity are
worth the costs of harm imposed by that activity. Nonetheless, the
reasonability standard of the First and Second Restatements explicitly asks courts to balance risk against harm, and to measure what
counts as a risk of harm against the actions of a reasonable prudent
person. 47 We find Stephen Gilles's perspective, couched in terms of
the First Restatement but equally true of the Second, to be on target:
"[T]he immediate point is that the risk-utility test is clearly meant to
be an aspect of the reasonable person standard, rather than a
replacement for it."48
It is also true that corrective justice theory plays a role in the
Restatements and the case law. Although it is more difficult to point
to a common denominator among corrective justice theories, for the
most part they share the imperative to ground negligence in concepts
of fairness or rights. The reasonable person standard of the Restatements clearly invites such normative considerations. There are
numerous cases that also depend on such considerations. The point is
the same for corrective justice theory and the Hand formula.
Undoubtedly a variety of common sense considerations about costs,
consequences and norms play a role in the decisions of negligence
cases; we just do not find much evidence that any one of these factors
has been blown into a general theory and successfully pressed upon
the courts or legislatures. For what it is worth, we suspect, but cannot
now show, that the success of the Restatements has resided, in large

mere fact that a court looks to the consequences of the challenged aspects of a party's conduct
does not tell us that the court endorses every (or any) particular conception of the Hand
Norm").
46.
47.

Id.
See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 75 cmt. b (1934): RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 283 cmt. e (1965).
48. Gilles, supra note 45, at 824.
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measure, in their capacity to encompass this variety of common sense
values.
There are only a few voices doubting the utility or accuracy of
conceptualizing negligence in terms of a top-down theory. Take
Steven Sugarman's noted attack on the entire regime of private law
centered tort adjudication: "Tort law is failing-failing to promote
better conduct, failing to compensate sensibly at acceptable costs, and
49
failing to do meaningful justice to either plaintiffs or defendants."
Sugarman's remedy, nonetheless, is to argue for a sweeping revolution of the tort system modeled on principles of social insurance and
employee benefits.50 We are not concerned with the merits of this
proposal; what interests us is the characterization of torts, including
negligence law, as a systemic failure and the attempt to replace it with
another system.
We have been able to identify only a small handful of scholars
who have argued that tort law cannot be governed by a general topdown theory. Perhaps the most notable is Richard Epstein. After
pioneering the use of corrective justice theory in the 1970s, it now
appears that Epstein has repudiated his earlier work insofar as it set
out a general theory for substantial parts, if not all, of tort law. As he
recently wrote:
Most modern legal theory is system building that seeks to locate the dominant features of legal rules in comprehensive, if not
formal, models of economic thought or political theory. This recent
move toward constructing wide-ranging theories represents a significant departure from the traditional mode of tort scholarship,
which directed its attention to analyzing and resolving5 marginal
cases that did not fit easily within conventional doctrines. 1
Yet the emergence of mass torts in the last generation raises a
very different set of questions. "In dealing with such complex cases,
the object of the system is not perfect justice, but damage control.
The right intellectual orientation is not to set the aspirations of the

49. Stephen D. Sugarman. Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 555,664 (1985).
50. Id.at 661-64.
51. Richard A. Epstein, The Temporal Dimension in Tort Law, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175,
1175-76 (1986): see also Richard A. Epstein. Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian
Constraints, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49 (1979): Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability. 2 J.
LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973): Richard A. Epstein, Defenses and Subsequent Pleas in a System of
Strict Liability. 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 165 (1974): Richard A. Epstein, Causation and Corrective
Justice: A Reply to Two Critics. 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 477 (1979).
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system too high. Trying to get the right result in all cases is noble, but
it is also unattainable."52
A few others have moved in the same direction. For John
Hasnas, academic tort theory and the reforms based on it have failed
to accomplish much because central government planning, in the
form of a sweeping overhaul of the tort system, is incapable of
directing the complexity of social interaction. 53 Christine Pierce
Wells contends that "rule based theories do not provide adequate
justification for the tort system," and in their place suggest that tort
verdicts may be justified, in a normative way, only if decision makers
are allowed to take into account a long list of complex issues.54
Two studies that attempted to measure the effect of law and economics (a form of top-down theorizing) on torts scholars and courts
are also on the skeptical side about the significance of top-down
theorizing. The first polled law and economics scholars to find if
there was any consensus among them about the efficiency of a variety
of tort doctrines. The survey included a question that asked whether
"[t]he standard of care under a negligence rule does induce an
optimal level of activity."55 The study found that there was no
consensus among tort scholars about whether negligence rules
produced optimal activity.56 Moreover, the study found that there
was "no grand consensus about [the efficacy of] common law tort
rules" in general. 57 While allusive, not much should be made of this
because of its methodology. The study was based on the return of
approximately 65 surveys out of 389 mailed to members of the
American Law and Economics Association.58
The second attempt to quantify the impact of economics is by
Izhak Englard, an Israeli legal scholar who surveyed the impact of
economic theory on judges in American tort cases from 1970 through
the 1990s.59 Englard has provided strong evidence "that the law and
52. Richard A. Epstein, Two Fallacies in the Law of Joint Torts, 73 GEO. L.J. 1377, 1377

(1985).
53.
54.

John Hasnas, What's Wrong with a Little Tort Reform?. 32 IDAHO L. REV. 557 (1996).
Christine Pierce Wells, Tort Law as Corrective Justice: A Pragmatic Justification for

Jury Adjudication, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2348. 2411 (1990).
55. John C. Moorhouse et al.. Law & Economics and Tort Law: A Survey of Scholarly
Opinion, 62 ALB. L. REV. 667, 670 (1998).
56. Id. at 667.
57. Id. at 694.
58. Id. at 668-69.
59. lzhak Englard. Law and Economics in American Tort Cases: A CriticalAssessment of
the Theory's Impact on Courts. 41 U. TORONTO L.J. 359 (1991).
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economics movement has had little but a rhetorical effect upon
contemporary processes of tort adjudication."60
Virtually all legal scholars have ignored these skeptics.61 Despite
the rather unified structure of this debate, with its easily identifiable
positions, the impact has been meager. As we suggest below, there
has been essentially no change to negligence instructions and the law
simply does not embody a corrective justice theory to the exclusion of
many other concerns (although we are unclear how good a test that
is), indicating the relative lack of practical significance to the
theorizing of either camp.
III. THE TREATMENT OF NEGLIGENCE BY THE COURTS
The conceptual structure of the Hand formula is reasonably
straightforward; if it captures the relevant phenomena, one would
expect the courts to employ it in their opinions and jury instructions,
and for legislatures to mandate its use. There is very little support for
either proposition. Courts do not rely heavily on the Hand Formula,
and every state that we have identified so far uses the traditional
reasonable person standard in its jury instructions.2 If the reasonable
60. William E. Nelson, From Fairnessto Efficiency: The Transformation of Tort Law in
New York, 1920-1980, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 117, 121 (1999): see also Englard, supra note 59.
61. We ignore many currents and tributaries, such as (1) scholars who criticize the
expansion of tort liability over the last forty years from a political or public policy perspective.
e.g., the expansion of tort liability has hurt innovation or closed down specific industries: (2)
scholars who contend that the tort system in the United States is built on essentially flawed
assumptions because it is a private law solution to a public problem that could better be solved
through no-fault accident insurance, e.g.. accident victims of many types, or perhaps all types.
could be compensated by the government, see Sugarman, supra note 49 (recommending that the
private tort regime be junked); (3) scholars who agree with the basic principles behind
normative or economic theories of tort law, but disagree with the specific mechanics of a theory
or theories created by other scholars, e.g., Mark F. Grady claims that the economic theory of
torts, in general, and the work of Posner, in particular, "took a wrong turn at an early point.
The commendable purpose was to develop a parsimonious model that would lay bare the basic
structure of negligence doctrine.... [A]s the theory has evolved, it has yielded ... assumptions
that are.., harmful to further progress." Grady, supra note 42, at 398: see also Mark F. Grady.
Why Are People Negligent? Technology, Nondurable Precautions,and the Medical Malpractice
Explosion, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 293, 294-96 (1988): (4) scholars who describe the relationship
between the recent history of tort doctrine and the developments in academic discourse, e.g.,
Gary T. Schwartz and George L. Priest have engaged in a lengthy debate about whether the
recent growth in liability rests on negligence or strict liability principles. See Gary T. Schwartz.
The Vitality of Negligence and the Ethics of Strict Liability, 15 GA. L. REV. 963 (1981): George
L. Priest & David G. Owen, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the
IntellectualFoundationsof Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461 (1985); Gary T. Schwartz,
The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of Modern American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REV.
601 (1992).
62. Louisiana allows a version of the Hand Formula as an optional instruction. See infra
note 76. We have not been able to identify the highest court of a state that disapproves of the
use of the Restatement (first or second) definition of negligence.
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person standard meant nothing more than the utility maximizing
outcome, the least cost avoider, or something similar, eventually that
is what juries would be instructed. No such trend is discernable.
Some support for the proposition that the legal system would migrate
to the straightforward economic instruction, if that accurately
captured what was intended to be conveyed, is provided by comparing the fate of the microeconomic arguments about negligence to the
analogous arguments about antitrust. In antitrust, instructions in
economic terms abound. Many rationalizations for this state of
affairs may be given, but one explanation leaps out: the economic
theorists got antitrust right and negligence wrong, which we explain in
part by the relative ambiguity and unpredictability of the two areas,
and by the relative role of common-sense reasoning. Other theorizing about negligence seems to have had very little impact as well.
This is demonstrated by the longevity and stability of the reasonable
person standard. We presently have no further tests of this proposition, however.
In this Section, we present the data indicating the relative lack of
significance of the Hand Formula on the courts. In the next Section,
we present the startling lack of any echoes of the Hand Formula in
jury instructions, save only in Louisiana, which in our judgment is the
exception that proves the rule. In Section V, we search a single
state's negligence jurisprudence (Illinois) for some signs of having
been affected by the Hand Formula, and compare this data to the
data from the one state that has been colonized (Louisiana). In
Section VI, we compare all of this to the obvious colonization of
antitrust by microeconomics.
A.

Data

The impact of legal theorizing has been minimal on the courts. 63
Outside of the Seventh Circuit, the ambit of Judge Posner, and the
Louisiana state courts, the Hand formula, as a robust, primary rule of

63. See Stephen G. Gilles, The Invisible Hand Formula, 80 VA. L. REV. 1015 (1994)
(discussing the nonapplication of the Hand formula); Mark F. Grady, A New Positive Economic
Theory of Negligence, 92 YALE L.J. 799 (1983) (critiquing the desirability of the Hand formula);
Thomas J. Miceli, Cause in Fact, Proximate Cause, and the Hand Rule: Extending Grady's
Positive Economic Theory of Negligence, 16 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 473 (1996) (critiquing the
desirability of the Hand formula); see also Richard A. Epstein, Law and Economics: Its
Glorious Past and Cloudy Future, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1167 (1997) (suggesting that the Hand
formula may have been a product of an early and flawed stage of the evolution of economic
theorizing in the United States).
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decision, is a virtual nonentity. Moreover, the evidence indicates that
instructions on negligence have remained stable over the last fifty
years, suggesting that the corrective justice theorists have not had a
noticeable impact, either.64
We searched for the impact of the Hand test in various ways, and
were struck by its insignificance. Few cases actually rely on the
formula; indeed, few cite it. Nor do they cite the relevant legal
theorists. A search for "Hand formula," "Hand /3 formula" and
"Hand test" 65 came up with approximately 30 federal court of appeals
references, 15 of which were from the Seventh Circuit following the
arrival of Judge Posner. There were 27 such cites in state cases, with
21 from a single jurisdiction (Louisiana). The CarrollTowing66 case is
cited once by the United States Supreme Court, approximately 50
times by United States courts of appeals, 38 times by United States
district courts, and 47 times by state courts. Out of an excess of
caution, perhaps, we also Shepardized the related T.J. Hooper67
decision. It has been cited 8 times by the Supreme Court, 72 times by
courts of appeals, 67 times by district courts, and 185 times by state
courts.6m These are not the numbers of a revolutionary or pathbreaking decision.69
B.

The Hand Formula in the Cases of Judge Hand and Judge Posner

As one can tell from the foregoing data, Judge Posner is the
principal exponent of the Hand formula, which is surely no great
surprise. Significantly, the use Judge Posner makes of the formula
contrasts sharply with Judge Hand's application. Judge Hand
explicitly recognized one of the difficulties inherent in applying the
Hand formula (a name he did not use) to the facts of a given case. He
understood that it is frequently impossible to quantify the variables.
In his words:
The difficulties are in applying the rule, as the Supreme Court observed in Conway v. O'Brien,... they arise from the necessity of
64. We base this conclusion on the widespread acceptance of the First and Second
Restatement of Torts.
65. These have to be looked at individually to exclude such phrases as "on the other hand,
tests. .. "

66.
67.
68.
69.
cases.

United States v. Carroll Towing Co., Inc., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).
And, interestingly, 323 times in law reviews.
Upon request, the authors will provide any interested scholar with the relevant lists of
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applying a quantitative test to an incommensurable subject matter;
and the same difficulties inhere in the concept of "'ordinary"' negligence. It is indeed possible to state an equation for negligence in
the form, C = P X D, in which the C is the care required to avoid
risk, D, the possible injuries, and P, the probability that the injuries
will occur, if the requisite care is not taken. But of these factors
care is the only one ever susceptible of quantitative estimate, and
often that is not. The injuries are always a variable within limits,
which do not admit of even approximate ascertainment; and, although probability might theoretically be estimated, if any statistics
were available, they never are; and, besides, probability varies with
the severity of the injuries. It follows that all such attempts are illusory; and, if serviceable at all, are so only to center attention upon

which one of the factors may be determinative in any given situation .... 70
Judge Posner's application of the formula is less shot through
with skepticism.71 His statement and application of the formula in the
most recent case is telling. Navarro v. Fuji Heavy Industries72
involved negligent product design, but the facts and procedural
posture of the case allowed the issue of product liability to be reduced
to the standard issue of negligence. As Posner summed up the Hand
formula:
As we said, this suit is based on negligence rather than on strict
products liability. But there is little or no practical difference in a
case of defective design, at least so far as the standard of liability is

concerned (we have just seen that there is a big difference with respect to the deadline for bringing suit): you must prove that the de-

sign was defective in either kind of case, and whether the design
was defective is determined by use of the same Hand-formula or
cost-benefit approach that is used to determine negligence in a tort
case not involving a product... .73
70. Moisan v. Loftus, 178 F.2d 148, 149 (2d Cir. 1949).
71. A search of the WESTLAW ALLFEDS database returned the following list of
opinions in which Posner was listed as the judge and the words Judge /3 Hand and Carroll (for
Carroll Towing) appeared-the actual search string was Ju (Posner) & Negligence & (Judge /3
Hand) Carroll: Halek v. United States, 178 F.3d 481 (7th Cir. 1999); Matter of Linton, 136 F.3d
544 (7th Cir. 1998); Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep't. of Admin., 44 F.3d 538 (7th Cir. 1995);
Winskunas v. Birnbaum, 23 F.3d 1264 (7th Cir. 1994); Bhd. Shipping Co. v. St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., 985 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1993); Villanova v. Abrams, 972 F.2d 792 (7th Cir. 1992);
United States v. Giovannetti, 919 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1990); Krist v. Eli Lilly & Co., 897 F.2d 293
(7th Cir. 1990); McCarty v. Pheasant Run, Inc., 826 F.2d 1554 (7th Cir. 1987); Hill v. Norfolk &
W. Ry. Co., 814 F.2d 1192 (7th Cir. 1987); Wright v. United States, 809 F.2d 425 (7th Cir. 1987);
Davis v. Consol. Rail Corp., 788 F.2d 1260 (7th Cir. 1986); Am. Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Hosp.
Prods. Ltd., 780 F.2d 589 (7th Cir. 1986); Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645 (7th Cir. 1985);
Flynn v. Merrick. 776 F.2d 184 (7th Cir. 1985); Llaguno v. Mingey, 763 F.2d 1560 (7th Cir. 1985):
United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Plovidba, 683 F.2d 1022 (7th Cir. 1982): Evra Corp. v. Swiss
Bank Corp., 673 F.2d 951 (7th Cir. 1982).
72. 117 F.3d 1027 (7th Cir. 1997).
73. Id. at 1029 (citations omitted).
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Despite Posner's typically strong and sweeping insistence that
the Hand formula is the legal standard for negligence, he has
qualified his views on at least one occasion: McCarty v. PheasantRun,
Inc.,74 a case involving the application of Illinois law to a negligence
claim made by a hotel guest assaulted in her room. Posner's holding
mirrors Hand's admission that it is difficult to put values to a formula
defining negligence and, at best, any formula merely serves to focus
the issues. Posner adds the thought that this practical problem may
only be an impediment for some time. As Posner puts the matter:
There are various ways in which courts formulate the negligence standard. The analytically (not necessarily the operationally)
most precise is that it involves determining whether the burden of
precaution is less than the magnitude of the accident, if it occurs,
multiplied by the probability of occurrence. (The product of this
multiplication, or "discounting," is what economists call an expected accident cost.) If the burden is less, the precaution should
be taken. This is the famous "Hand Formula" announced in United
States v. Carroll Towing Co. (L. Hand, J.), an admiralty case, and
since applied in a variety of cases not limited to admiralty.
We are not authorized to change the common law of Illinois,
however, and Illinois courts do not cite the Hand Formula but instead define negligence as failure to use reasonable care, a term left
undefined. But as this is a distinction without a substantive difference, we have not hesitated to use the Hand Formula in cases governed by Illinois law. The formula translates into economic terms
the conventional legal test for negligence. This can be seen by considering the factors that the Illinois courts take into account in negligence cases: the same factors, and in the same relation, as in the
Hand Formula. Unreasonable conduct is merely the failure to take
precautions that would generate greater benefits in avoiding accidents than the precautions would cost.
Ordinarily, and here, the parties do not give the jury the information required to quantify the variables that the Hand Formula
picks out as relevant. That is why the formula has greater analytic
than operational significance. Conceptual as well as practical difficulties in monetizing personal injuries may continue to frustrate efforts to measure expected accident costs with the precision that is
possible, in principle at least, in measuring the other side of the
equation-the cost or burden of precaution. For many years to
come juries may be forced to make rough judgments of reasonableness, intuiting rather than measuring the factors in the Hand Formula; and so long as their judgment is reasonable, the trial judge
has no right to set it aside, let alone substitute his own judgment. 75

74. 826 F.2d 1554 (7th Cir. 1987).
75. Id. at 1556-57 (citations omitted).
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It is simply not clear how Posner reconciles his insistence that the
Hand formula accurately models negligence and his concession that
"for many years to come" juries will have to make rough judgments
based on intuitions of reasonableness. Perhaps an argument could be
made that the unseen and implicit working of the common law system
may reconcile the gap between the difficulty of implementing the
Hand formula and its pristine conceptual logic.
Whatever time may bring, it is tolerably clear that Posner has
underestimated the real problems which would confront a decision
maker attempting to apply the Hand formula. Even in a perfect
environment, however that might be defined, there is an abundance
of evidence suggesting that jurors, or judges for that matter, may not
be able to conduct anything approaching a reliable application of the
Hand formula. The many variables involved in applying the Hand
formula would, in all probability, involve decision makers in the snare
of computation intractability. This may be why the real world of
negligence litigation has largely been immune to Hand's and Posner's
theorizing, as evidenced by the relatively few citations in the courts.
There is other evidence of this minimal impact as well, to which we
now turn.
IV. JURY INSTRUCTIONS

In addition to searching for cases that adopted or applied the
Hand formula, we searched for jury instructions that adopt either
some strong version of the Hand formula or corrective justice theory.
The Hand formula is straightforward, and easy to grasp, as are many
of the positions of the corrective justice theorists. Besides the use of
the term "reasonable," there is no indication in the jury instructions
that we have located indicating that they were shaped along the lines
of an articulated, general theory or influenced by the corrective
justice theorists (and use of the word "reasonable" long preceded
these writings). "Reasonable person" by contrast, is considerably less
precise if what is meant is utility maximization, cost/benefit, "least
cost avoider," etc. Were judges, legislators, and the practicing bar to
come to realize, as Posner asserts, that "reasonable person" and some
economic concept are synonymous, one would predict that the more
precise and easy-to-understand language would supplant the less
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precise and opaque language. 76 This has not happened. Not only has
the Hand formula not become the standard jury instruction, but also
we could find almost no evidence of its use. Louisiana is the only
state to our knowledge that employs a variant of the Hand instruction
77
as an optional instruction at trial.
We conducted our research using the WESTLAW database and
a variety of standard jury instruction treatises. The WESTLAW JIALL database contains jury instructions for California, Florida,
Illinois, Maryland, New York and Washington, as well as a hodgepodge of Federal Instructions. Stephen G. Gilles has also examined
jury instructions, many of which are not on WESTLAW. They all use
8
the reasonable man standard.7
The typical negligence jury instruction is similar to those of
California, Florida and Illinois.
California:
Negligence is the doing of something which a reasonably prudent person would not do, or the failure to do something which a
reasonably prudent person would do, under circumstances similar
to those shown by the evidence.
It is the failure to use ordinary or reasonable care.
Ordinary or reasonable care is that care which persons of ordinary prudence would use in order to avoid injury to themselves or
others under circumstances similar to those shown by the evidence.
[You will note that the person whose conduct we set up as a
standard is not the extraordinarily cautious individual, nor the exceptionally79skillful one, but a person of reasonable and ordinary
prudence.]
Florida:
Negligence is the failure to use reasonable care. Reasonable
care is that degree of care which a reasonably careful person would
use under like circumstances. Negligence may consist either in do76. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT

LAW, 163-67 (1987).
77. We didn't find this, actually; Patrick Kelley did.
Negligence-General Composite Charge in Ordinary Case:
[Optional paragraph.]
[The ordinarily prudent person will avoid creating an unreasonable risk of harm.
In determining whether the defendant breached this standard, and created an
unreasonable risk of harm, you may weigh the likelihood that someone might have
been injured and the seriousness of that injury against the importance to society of
what the defendant was doing and the advisability of the way in which he was doing it,
under the circumstances.]
La. J.1. Civ. 3.01 (1994 & Supp. 2001).
78. Gilles, supra note 63, at 1016.
79. Cal. B.A.J.I. Civ. 3.10 (8th ed. 1994 & Supp. 2002).
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ing something that a reasonably careful person would not do under
like circumstances, or in failing to do something that a reasonably
careful person would do under like circumstances. 80
Illinois:
When I use the word negligence in these instructions, I mean
the failure to do something which a reasonably careful person
would do, or the doing of something which a reasonably careful
person would not do, under circumstances similar to those shown
by the evidence. The law does not say how a reasonably careful
person would act under those circumstances. That is for you to decide.8'
This similarity, of course, is not an accident. The majority of
states and United States courts follow the widely successful Second
Restatement of Torts.82
The upshot of this data is that jury instructions uniformly refer to
the reasonable person standard, and have done so since before the
dawn of the modern crop of legal economists,83 and only a few
appellate courts cite to the Hand formula. The evidence to date
suggests that both the corrective justice theories and the formula are
largely irrelevant to the actual operation of the legal system.8 4 As we
said previously, we think this is because both rest upon a model that
misconceives the phenomena under investigation. Matters involving
high degrees of ambiguity and unpredictability, and amenable to
common-sense reasoning, will be decided, quite sensibly, through the
exercise of common-sense judgments rather than the application of
ill-fitting and computationally intractable formulas. Negligence can
arise in virtually any human interaction, and thus its contours cannot
be known in advance. The relevant variables are too numerous to
allow computation, and thus again some form of judgment must be
exercised. Last, and probably most importantly, judgments of
negligence involve how people should muddle through in life. This is

80. Fla. S.J.I. Civ. 4.1 (2001).
81. I11.P.J.I. Civ. 10.01 (2000).
82. We base this point on the near universal acceptance of the First and Second
Restatements of Torts basic definition of negligence. See Gilles, supra note 45.
83. The First Restatement, embracing the reasonable person standard, was published in
1934, for example.
84. Patrick J. Kelley and Laurel A. Wendt are conducting a state-by-state canvass to
determine the content of negligence instructions. They have found no references to anything
remotely like the economic conception of negligence. Patrick J. Kelley and Laurel A. Wendt,
What Judges Tell Juries About Negligence: A Review of Pattern Jury Instructions, 77 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 587 (2002); see also Patrick J. Kelley, Teaching Torts: The Carroll Towing Company
Case and the Teaching of Tort Law, 45 ST. Louis U. L.J. 731 (2001).

2002]

LEGAL PHENOMENA, KNOWLEDGE, AND THEORY

largely a matter of common sense understanding of society rather
than a technical question requiring expertise.
Another natural test of our hypothesis will soon be run. The
negligence section of the proposed draft of the Third Restatement of
Torts includes a strongly worded, explicit endorsement of the Hand
formula.85 This constitutes a significant departure from the negligence section of the Second Restatement of Torts:86
A person acts with negligence if the person does not exercise
reasonable care under all the circumstances. Primary factors to
consider in ascertaining whether the person's conduct lacks
reasonable care are the foreseeable likelihood that it will result in
harm, the foreseeable severity of the harm that may ensue, and the
burden that would be borne by the person and others if the person
takes precautions that eliminate or reduce the possibility of harm.87
If anything could boost the Hand formula, we suspect it is the
approval of the American Law Institute. For reasons we have
identified, we doubt even this will be sufficient, but we shall see. We
note, as well, the temporizing of the Third Restatement; the Hand
formula is a primary factor, but certainly not an exclusive one.8
V. THE ILLINOIS AND LOUISIANA CASES: A NATURAL
EXPERIMENT
Some have claimed that cases actually are decided consistently
with the Hand formula, regardless of how juries are instructed.9 This
could be because juries instinctively return verdicts consistently with
85. RESTATEMENT

(THIRD) OF TORTS:

LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM

(BASIC

PRINCIPLES) § 3 (Tentative Draft. No. 1, May 2001).
86. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (1965). The reporter for the Third
Restatement is Professor Gary T. Schwartz. Schwartz has been a cautious critic of private-lawcentered tort law regimes. See, e.g., Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort
Law: Does Tort Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377 (1994). He does believe,
nonetheless, that the present tort system may be "moderately successful" and that it is based on
some implicit and loose notion of economic efficiency. He rests these beliefs on a few studies of
the costs and benefits of various tort regimes, such as medical malpractice. Although his
conclusions are tentative, it appears to Schwartz that what little is known about the tort system
shows that economic incentives do deter, a point which he takes, for unexplained reasons, to
support the conclusion that efficiency motivates tort law and serves as its goal.
87. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:

LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM

(BASIC

PRINCIPLES) § 3 (Tentative Draft. No. 1, May 2001).
88. One scholar, reacting to the language in the Third Restatement, believes that the Hand
formula can accommodate both economic and fairness accounts of negligence law. Kenneth W.
Simons, The Hand Formulain the Draft Restatement (Third) of Torts: EncompassingFairness as
well as Efficiency Values, 54 VAND. L. REV. 901, 902 (2001).
89. We do not see how to test the claim that the results in tort cases are consistent with any
particular corrective justice model. We suspect in any event that such a claim would be circular
(juries are the voice of the community, and so on).
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the Hand formula or because judges revise verdicts to bring them in
line with the formula. The first strikes us as exceedingly unlikely for
various psychological and sociological reasons, and little more than a
wishful expression of faith from the (supposedly scientific) economists. It is similarly unclear to us how judges might bring Hand-like
rigor to verdicts, as the judges, trial and appellate, are limited in their
capacity to change jury verdicts.
Accordingly, we decided to search for evidence supporting this
theory of appellate decisions conforming negligence cases to the
Hand formula by examining a sample of negligence cases to see if one
could tell from their facts and judicial treatment of the verdicts
whether the Hand formula or a proxy seemed to be integral to the
decisions. The difficulty with this, of course, is that, as Judge Hand
himself pointed out, the data do not exist, which one would think
would be a devastating critique of the economic position. Still, this
opens the field for creative explanations as to why liability served
economic efficiency just right. We must say that looking at the
Illinois cases leads to the distinct impression that a justification for
them in terms of economic efficiency can only lead to great admiration for the creativity but not the veracity of the effort. Indeed, for
the cases that we looked at, we suspect it would be hard to make such
arguments with a straight face.
Our interest in the veracity of the economic explanation of negligence was sparked in part by the notorious and shocking case of Lee
v. Chicago TransitAuthority.90 As we describe below, Lee cannot be
explained by the microeconomic arguments. Perhaps, though, Lee is
an aberration. To search for evidence of this possibility, we searched
for the word "negligence" in the Illinois Supreme Court cases from
December 1, 1991 through December 7, 1993 (the two years surrounding the Lee case).91 The search generated forty-seven cases. In
thirty-eight of the cases, not even the most creative interpreter could
find a hint of a reference to economic theories of negligence (the
cases largely deal with other issues).92 Of the remaining nine cases
dealing more fully with negligence, eight give no support to the
economic argument whatsoever, and one gives only mild support.
90. 605 N.E.2d 493 (Ill. 1992).
91. Search String: All Sources > States Legal - U.S. > Illinois > Cases and Court Rules > By
Court > IL Supreme Court Cases. Terms: negligence and date (geq (12/1/1991) and leq
(12/7/1993)) (Edit Search). Results: 47.
92. The word appeared in the opinions for various reasons, such as simply noting the
underlying cause of action.
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Perhaps this two-year period is aberrational. To account for this
possibility, we expanded our search to a ten-year period.93 The tenyear search confirmed that the original two-year study was representative of Illinois jurisprudence. We report the details of the cases in
the two-year sample below94
Louisiana is different. The appellate courts in Louisiana have
both accepted the Hand formula as the meaning of negligence and
attempted to employ it directly in their decisions, and it seems that it
is the only state that does so. We give examples of this below, as well,
for it indicates that courts can, indeed, attempt to mold negligence
cases into the economic form. That every other state but Louisiana
does not is good evidence of the limited impact of this version of
microeconomic reasoning.
We start with the Lee case, as it first brought our attention to this
issue, and we then discuss the eight other cases from this two-year
sample.
1. Lee v. Chicago Transit Authority95 dealt with the following
facts, taken from the dissenting justices' opinion:
This case demonstrates once again the casino-like atmosphere
of our tort system. A drunken 46-year-old Korean immigrant
whose blood alcohol was 0.341, or three times the legal limit for intoxication under the motor vehicle code, walked off the sidewalk
and up the Chicago Transit Authority railroad tracks where he was
electrocuted by the so-called third rail which supplies power to the
electric trains. At his point of entry, the decedent walked past
three warning signs, "DANGER," "KEEP OUT" and
"ELECTRIC CURRENT." These signs were printed in English
which the decedent could not read. With a 0.341 concentration of
blood alcohol, however, it is questionable whether it would have

93. We searched the WESTLAW Supreme Court of Illinois database for the term
"negligence" for the period beginning December 1, 1991 and ending December 1, 2001. This
search produced 248 cases, including the cases from the 1992 to 1993 time period examined
above. Obviously, this search produced a variety of cases dealing with torts as well as many
other substantive legal issues, such as post-conviction review of criminal cases. In order to
throw the net as widely as possible, each of the 248 cases was read to determine if the Hand
formula or an implicit equivalent formed the basis of a rule of decision or the reasoning behind
the holding. In no case did the Hand formula, or any form of balancing consequences, form the
sole basis of the rule or rationale of the case. At best, the Supreme Court of Illinois balanced
the consequences flowing from the case at hand in the context of a variety of other prominent
facts, including the reasonable person standard, the relevant precedent, and the expectations of
the parties. Upon request, the authors will provide interested scholars with the list of cases the
search generated.
94. Mr. Rosenberg will provide our research notes on the remaining eight-year sample to
any interested scholar.
95. 605 N.E.2d 493 (Ill. 1992).
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mattered if the signs had been printed in Korean or even in pictures. The decedent was virtually blind drunk.
In addition to the signing, sharp triangular shaped boards had
been installed between the sidewalk and the third rail to make it extremely difficult and awkward for a person to walk up the tracks.
Nonetheless, the decedent walked up the tracks approximately 6
1/2 feet to the point where the third rail began. There, attempting
to urinate, he was electrocuted. 96
We think it rather plain that it cannot be established that utility
is maximized here. Mr. Lee had available to him numerous cheap
methods of avoiding this accident, such as not getting blind drunk,
having someone look after him, relieving himself anywhere but on the
electrified rail of the Chicago Transit Authority ("CTA"), etc. The
CTA, by contrast, would have had to anticipate all ways in which
blind drunks might hurt themselves and provide nearly foolproof
mechanisms for stopping them from doing so. In fact, the CTA
presented evidence of the substantial cost of providing alternative
security methods that would keep the blindly drunk from urinating on
the third rail. This considerably understates the cost to the CTA,
however, as a priori the CTA had no knowledge that this is how a
blindly drunk person would be electrified. Apparently Mr. Lee's
representatives did not contest cost. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court
of Illinois affirmed a jury verdict for Mr. Lee without anything
remotely like an economic cost-benefit analysis. Although it
mentioned some of the economic factors, the court explicitly disregarded the cost to the CTA rather than attempt to determine relative
costs and benefits:
Here, the close proximity of the third rail to the sidewalk significantly increased the likelihood of injury to pedestrians who used
the sidewalk. At trial, the CTA presented evidence that alternate
means of guarding the right-of-way against pedestrian entry could
be problematic to install and maintain. That notwithstanding, we
believe that the risk of serious injury or death to a pedestrian as a
result of contact with a third rail located at grade level, in close
proximity to a sidewalk, outweighs any burdens associated9 7with
more formidable safeguards or, at the least, adequate warning.
Perhaps the CTA should be insurers against blind drunks coming
into contact with the third rail, but there is nothing in this case
indicating that their doing so is utility maximizing or economically
efficient. That there is not even a discussion in the case of the a priori

96. Id. at 512-13 (Heiple, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 502.
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risk, obviously a necessary component in a cost/benefit analysis,
supports this conclusion.
The eight cases decided within a year of Lee likewise give essentially no support for the economic argument:
2. Gill v. Foster48 was a medical malpractice suit disposed of on
summary judgment. The plaintiff failed to follow his doctor's
repeated advice to transfer facilities. Injury to the plaintiff occurred
shortly after a nurse failed to diagnose a pre-existing problem. The
appellate court and the Supreme Court upheld the dismissal without
any reference to costs or economic efficiency.
3. In Uhrhan v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.,99 a railroad worker
was injured when he tripped over debris in the night. The issue was
whether the trial court correctly instructed the jury on contributory
negligence. The appellate court determined the trial court had erred
and that contributory negligence was not at issue in the case. The
plaintiff could not have been expected to be more careful than he was
because his job was to keep an eye on the train signals, not on the
ground. The Illinois Supreme Court observed that contributory
negligence instructions are appropriate if there is something to
suggest the plaintiff did not follow the rules set by the employer. In
this case, there was a rule to watch out for and report any debris on
the ground. It was thus a question for the jury, not the appellate
court, whether the plaintiff had acted reasonably. The opinion
contains no discussion of comparative costs and benefits.
4. Curatola v. Village of NileslOO focused on whether the plaintiff
was an intended and permitted user of the part of the road of which
he sustained injury, but there is a short discussion of negligence. The
plaintiff injured his ankle when he stepped out of his truck and into a
pothole after unloading goods while parked on the street. Economic
efficiency clearly does not explain the outcome:
We do not consider lightly the claim by Niles and the City that
a duty to maintain the streets for persons exiting and entering lawfully parked vehicles is burdensome. Today, the resources of many
local governmental entities are reduced even as insurance costs rise.
Thus, we carefully consider the relevant factors pertaining to the
imposition of a duty: (1) foreseeability that the defendant's conduct
will result in injury to another; (2) likelihood of injury; (3) the magnitude of guarding against it; and (4) the consequences of placing
98. 626 N.E.2d 190 (Ill. 1993).
99. 617 N.E.2d 1182 (I1. 1993).
100. 608 N.E.2d 882 (IIl. 1993).
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that burden upon the defendant. As the parties admit and our case
law demonstrates, it is entirely foreseeable as well as likely that
such injuries will occur. We note that municipalities are at present
charged with the duty to maintain parking lanes for vehicles. We
fail to appreciate that costs to maintain those areas for the operators and occupants getting into and out of those same vehicles are
prohibitive of any duty to those persons. Further, contrary to the
City's assertion, the standard of reasonable care to maintain parking lanes for such users is not equivalent to the standard of care
owed to pedestrians on sidewalks. We note, too, that regardless of
the burden, the entire community ultimately bears the risk. To that
end, the risk under these circumstances is best spread among all
members of the community by imposing such duty upon local entities. "'Duty' is not sacrosanct in itself, but is only an expression of
the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to
say that the plaintiff is entitled to protection." We believe that
public policy and social considerations of these times and of our
community require that a duty to maintain the immediate street
around lawfully parked vehicles be placed upon local governmental
entities.'01
5. In Thompson v. County of Cook,102 Thompson, a passenger,
was killed in a single car accident when the driver of the car missed a
curve while trying to evade a police car in pursuit. The driver was
legally intoxicated. Thompson's family alleged negligence against the
county for failing to post adequate warning at the approach to the
curve. In disposing of the case, the court said, without mentioning
anything remotely related to economic efficiency:
The plaintiffs nonetheless contend that the signs at the curve
where the accident occurred were inadequate and that the county's
negligence caused the accident which resulted in Thompson's
death. Illinois courts have long distinguished, however, between
condition and causation. This court recognized that distinction ... defining proximate cause as follows: "The cause of an in-

jury is that which actually produces it, while the occasion is that
which provides an opportunity for causal agencies to act." If a defendant's negligence does nothing more than furnish a condition by
which injury is made possible, that negligence is not the proximate
cause of injury.
Proximate cause is also absent where the independent acts of a
third person break the causal connection between the alleged original wrong and the injury. When that occurs, the independent act itself becomes a proximate or immediate cause.
[The driver's] actions in driving while drunk, speeding, eluding
the police, and disregarding traffic signs were the sole proximate
101. Id. at 888-89 (citations omitted).
102. 609 N.E.2d 290 (I11.1993).
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cause of this accident. Sutton Road provided nothing more
than a
13
location where [the driver's] negligence came to fruition. 0
6. DiBenedetto v. Flora Township,104 is yet another negligence
case with no obvious connection to the economic arguments:
The gist of the complaint in this case was that the ditch along
the road was not safe to be driven in. The question is, Does the defendant township have a duty to the motoring public to make its
drainage ditches which run parallel to the traveled way to be safe
for vehicular traffic? We hold not. There is no claim here that the
traveled portion of the road, including the shoulder, was anything
but safe. The drainage ditch was there for the purpose of receiving
surface water and thereby protecting the traveled way from flooding. It was not designed to carry vehicular traffic. The right-of-way
had three component parts, namely, the traveled way, the shoulder
and the drainage ditch. Each of the parts was fulfilling its intended
function. What happened in this case was that decedent, for whatever reason, lost control of his car, drove across an oncoming lane
of the roadway, on across the shoulder and into the ditch where his
car overturned and he was killed....
Drainage ditches along streets and highways are both commonplace and necessary. People are not expected to drive in them
and the public cannot be an insurer of those who do. Although
there is a paucity of cases on this issue, we interpret that lack to the
fact that the conclusion is obvious and that the opposite result
would be contrary to normal expectations and experience in the affairs of life....
Neither a township nor a municipality is an insurer against all
accidents occurring on the public way .... 105
7. In Hutchings v. Bauer,106 the defendants operated a horse
training business, part of which was located near a curve in the public
road. Cars had missed the curve a number of times over the years, so
the defendants asked the township to install a guardrail. The
township denied the request and the defendants built their own
barrier in order to protect themselves, their property, and their
horses. They "notified the Lake County highway department by
letter that they had built a 'barricade of large posts' on their property
to stop drivers who failed to make the curve." 107 The court included
some language consistent with the economic arguments, but largely

seemed to ignore them:

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 294 (citations omitted).
605 N.E.2d 571 (II1. 1992).
Id. at 573-74.
599 N.E.2d 934 (IIl. 1992).
Id. at 934-35.
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[T]he plaintiff... [was] driving [his] motorcycle[] along Callahan
Road. The speed limit for this area was 35 miles per hour, but the
"advisory" speed limit as posted for the curve [he was] entering was
25 miles per hour. In order to warn motorists of the curve, several
signs were posted along the road.... Plaintiff was negotiating the
curve at a speed which he estimated to be 35 to 37 miles per hour
when he hit some loose gravel, slid across the gravel shoulder for 10
or 15 feet, and then went onto the grass to the right of the shoulder
where he traveled some 50 to 100 yards. Then, still upright and
traveling on the grassy area at a speed between 15 and 20 miles per
hour, plaintiff felt that he was still going too fast to safely turn back
onto the road. Instead of either slowing or stopping, he decided to
drive between two of the defendants' vertical posts. As plaintiff attempted to pass through the posts at a speed of about 15 miles per
hour, he hit a horizontal log or post which ran between the vertical
posts. Plaintiff was unable to see the log due to the grass which had
grown up around it. As a result of striking the barrier, plaintiff sustained severe and permanent injuries....
Defendants had a right to operate their horse training farm
and to take reasonable precautions to protect themselves, their
fencing and their horses from incursions of motor vehicles over and
across their land. The defendants were under no duty to dedicate
and donate their land to the public without compensation for use as
a travelled way. To hold otherwise would constitute a denial of
substantive due process....
It is also to be noted that the barrier which the defendants constructed was a reasonable barrier. It was not designed to cause injury or harm. It was not a pit or a trap. Except for the bottom
horizontal log which was obscured by tall grass, it was quite visible.
It was intended solely to stop the movement of vehicles across the
defendants' property for the protection of the defendants. It was
not dangerous, save in the sense that it was a barrier. Needless to
say, when a moving vehicle strikes any immovable or fixed object
with sufficient force, some damage or injury from the collision
would be expected, the extent of damage depending on a variety of
factors including speed.
It is also to be noted that the plaintiff chose to drive his motorcycle around the curve at a speed 10 to 12 miles above the "advisory" speed limit posted for the curve .... Im
8. In American National Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago v.
NationalAdvertising Co.,109 the court mentioned that the cost to the
defendant of avoiding the accident were low. However, that was just
one factor among many that the court viewed as relevant to the
nature of negligence. Lukas was electrocuted while working on a

108. Id. at 935-36.
109. 594 N.E.2d 313 (I11.1992).
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billboard scaffold, and the administrator of his estate sought to collect
damages from the lessee of the sign.
The parties agree that decedent came into contact with the
electrical wire as he was transferring from the walkrail to the ladder. Photographs of the accident site reveal that, at least in the
light and from the angle at which the photographs were taken, the
wire is clearly visible. Thus the danger was arguably open and obvious....

'Foreseeability means that which it is objectively reasonableto
expect, not merely what might conceivably occur.' Since the purpose of the walkrail was to allow workers to walk the full length of
the sign in order to make repairs, it was objectively reasonable to
expect that a worker could come into contact with a power line that
hung only 4 1/2 to 5 feet above the walkrail. It was also reasonable
to expect that a worker might be distracted by having to watch
where to place his feet, and consequently would not be aware of or
remember the presence of the electric wires. Thus, defendant had
reason to anticipate an injury such as the one which occurred.
Further, the burden on defendant to protect workers against
the hazardous power line would not have been heavy. National
might have shortened the walkrail so that it no longer ran under the
power line. Alternatively, National might have demanded that the
utility company relocate the power line. At very little expense or
inconvenience, National might have warned workers of the hazard.
For the above reasons, we find that National owed a duty of reasonable care to the decedent....
The record reveals that some workers on the sign had not noticed
the overhanging wires; there is also testimony from one worker that
he had seen the wires and was aware of the danger they represented. The trier of fact must evaluate all the evidence .... 110
9. In Wojdyla v. City of Park Ridge,", a car hit the plaintiff's
decedent while he was walking across the street to his own parked
car. The plaintiff alleged negligence on the part of the city for not
providing adequate lighting. The court decided in favor of the city,
holding that the city had no duty of care because decedent was not an
intended user of the street, as he was not crossing at a crosswalk. The
court stated, "[t]his court long ago recognized that a municipality is
not required to provide improvements such as lights or crosswalks,
although where it endeavors to do so it must not be negligent in this
undertaking."12 The plaintiff did make an argument consistent with
an economic analysis, which the court rejected:
110. Id. at 319-20 (citations omitted).
111. 592 N.E.2d 1098 (Ill. 1992).
112. Id. at 1103 (citations omitted).

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77:683

Plaintiff also asserts that it would be unreasonable to expect
the decedent to have walked the mile round trip which would have
been necessary to use a crosswalk to cross the street to his legally
parked car. Plaintiff's argument here, in essence, is that the absence of a crosswalk shows or creates an intent by the City that pedestrians be allowed to cross highways at will wherever street
parking is allowed, and that the City, when it illuminates a street,
must light the street adequately for their use. Inasmuch as the City
is not required to provide crosswalks in the first place, we fail
to see
how the absence of crosswalks can give rise to such a duty. 1 3
The Illinois cases in 1992 and 1993 provide no support for the
economic theory of negligence. The cases do not attempt to impose
the economic theory on the results of verdicts, and the facts of the
cases cannot plausibly be reconciled with the theory, although the
cases indicate the banal point that relative costs and benefits are not
irrelevancies. Even though our sample was not randomly selected,
this is significant evidence disconfirming the economic argument. In
any particular case, an appellate court may not need to invoke the
economic arguments even if those arguments capture the court's view
on the legal phenomenon. However, this is a string of nine cases in a
row. Suppose the probability of a court invoking and relying upon
the economic arguments in a jurisdiction where negligence is
fashioned from them is .5; in other words, half the time the court
discusses efficiency, and half the time there is no need to. Assuming
independence,14 the probability of a string of nine consecutive cases
not relying on the economic perspective is .59, or about one in 500.
More plausibly, if the probability that a court discussing the nature of
negligence would actually discuss what it believed that nature to be
were more like .8, then the probability of having a string of nine
straight cases such as these would be .2', or about one in two million.
And actually, the reality of the Illinois cases over this period of time
is forty-seven consecutive cases mentioning negligence without one
rigorously tying the concept to the economic arguments.
Moreover, we found nothing inconsistent with the cases noted
above when we expanded the research to cover a ten-year period.
Although costs and benefits were relevant variables, no cases
grounded a decision on the implications of a cost-benefit analysis in a
way consistent with the economic prediction. As with the cases
detailed above, by far the most robust variables were such matters as
the settled expectations of the parties and common sense. There is
113. Id. at 1104.
114. Clearly a false assumption, but one made for ease of exposition,
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simply very little or no evidence in the Illinois cases of the appellate
courts attempting to fashion negligence cases into an economic form;
there is literally no case in our set that looks at all like the Louisiana
cases discussed immediately below. In any event, the proposition that
the Illinois cases do not provide support for the economic arguments
can easily be disconfirmed if it is false by an even further extension of
our work. What we have provided is so startling that we believe it
satisfies our purposes here.
The cases from Louisiana, the one state explicitly adopting the
Hand formula, could not be more different from the Illinois cases.
The cases speak so clearly for themselves that we simply reproduce
relevant excerpts from Dobson v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 15
the Supreme Court of Louisiana case adopting the Hand approach,
and one standard courts of appeals treatment of the issue. First, from
Dobson:
The generally accepted view is that negligence is defined as
conduct which falls below the standard established by law for the
protection of others against an unreasonable risk of harm. The test
for determining whether a risk is unreasonable is supplied by the
following formula. The amount of caution "demanded of a person
by an occasion is the resultant of three factors: the likelihood that
his conduct will injure others, taken with the seriousness of the injury if it happens, and balanced against the interest which he must
sacrifice, or the cost of the precaution he must take, to avoid the
risk.". L. Hand, J. in Conway v. O'Brien. If the product of the
likelihood of injury multiplied times the seriousness of the injury
exceeds the burden of the precautions, the risk is unreasonable and
the failure to take precautions or sacrifice the interest is negligence.
The foregoing conception has been referred to by legal scholars as
the "Hand formula," the "Learned Hand test" or the "risk-benefit"
balancing test.

...

It assists us to concentrate here on the costs of the precautions
necessary to avoid the accident because the magnitude of the danger caused by the conduct of either Dobson or LP&L was extreme.
If the risk that a person might come into contact with the bare high
voltage distribution line were to take effect, the anticipated gravity
of the loss was of the highest degree. Dobson's conduct in lowering
himself down the tree trunk with a metallically reinforced safety
line dangling below near the electric wires substantially increased
the possibility of such an accident. But so did LP&L's conduct in
transmitting high voltage electricity through its uninsulated distribution lines in a residential subdivision without regular inspection
of its equipment and right of way, regular maintenance of its right
of way by trimming unsafe trees and limbs, insulation of its lines in
115. 567 So. 2d 569 (La. 1990).
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close proximity to trees, or installation of adequate warnings of the
dangerous uninsulated condition of the distribution lines. The
chances of an accident were further increased when LP&L, by refusing to respond to Mrs. Davidge's complaints, encouraged her to
take it upon herself to remove the limbs and trees in close proximity to the uninsulated distribution lines. The odds of an electrocution were raised again when LP&L failed to warn Dobson
specifically of the uninsulated distribution lines although the company had knowledge that he was a new, inexperienced tree trimmer
working in the neighborhood where the lines were located.
Confining ourselves to the factor of the cost of taking an effective precaution to avoid the risk, it appears to us that the cost or
burden of eliminating the danger would have been greater for
Dobson than for LP&L. As we have indicated, the power company
had a number of relatively inexpensive, efficacious precautions
available to it, e.g., inspection, maintenance, partial insulation,
public education and visible warnings. Moreover, there was one
particularly effective way in which LP&L could have eliminated the
risk at little or no cost-by explicitly warning Dobson about the
uninsulated high voltage distribution lines and telling him how to
distinguish them from the insulated dwelling service lines. On the
other hand, the cost to Dobson, who was ignorant of the characteristics of the uninsulated distribution lines and therefore unaware of
their special danger, exceeded the cost to a person with superior
capacity and knowledge. An actor with "inferior" capacity to avoid
harm must expend more effort to avoid a danger than need a person with "superior" ability .... 116
Following the Louisiana Supreme Court's lead, the appellate
courts in Louisiana routinely apply the Hand formula. Consider, for
example, Pinsouneaultv. Merchants & FarmersBank & Trust Co.:117
The test for determining whether a risk is unreasonable is supplied
by the following formula. The amount of caution "demanded of a
person by an occasion is the resultant of three factors: the likelihood that his conduct will injure others, taken with the seriousness
of the injury if it happens, and balanced against the interest which
he must sacrifice [or the cost of the precaution he must take] to
avoid the risk." L. Hand, J. in Conway v. O'Brien.
If the product of the likelihood of injury multiplied times the
seriousness of the injury exceeds the burden of the precautions, the
risk is unreasonable and the failure to take precautions or sacrifice
the interest is negligence. The foregoing conception has been referred to by legal scholars as the "Hand formula," the "Learned
Hand test" or the "risk-benefit" balancing test.
In the present case, where foreseeability of armed robbery at
the night depository has been established, the likelihood that the
116. Id. at 574-76 (citations omitted).
117. 738 So. 2d 172 (La. Ct. App. 1999).
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bank's failure to provide security would lead to the shooting death
of a night deposit patron far outweighs the cost of installing surveillance cameras, cutting down shrubbery, upgrading lighting
and/or extending a fence .... 118
To reiterate, courts are quite competent to attempt to apply the
Hand formula analysis if they choose to do so. The Louisiana courts
do so as directed by their supreme court. The rest of the country does
not. As we previously mentioned, Louisiana also permits a version of
the Hand formula to be used in instructing juries. Louisiana thus
appears to be the exception that proves the rule.
VI. ANTITRUST LAW

The microeconomic explanation of antitrust law has been with us
as long or longer than the microeconomic explanation of negligence.
While negligence law has resisted the intrusion, antitrust law has
welcomed it. This is no great surprise. The goal of antitrust law is
typically phrased in economic terms; the purpose of the Sherman Act,
in the words of one widely circulated pattern jury instruction, is to:
"preserve and advance our system of free, competitive enterprise."'19
Nonetheless, not all of antitrust law is explicitly procompetitive or,
for that matter, governed by straightforwardly microeconomic
demands. It is only necessary to look as far as the well-known
defenses to Sherman Act claims, such as the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine, or the immunity granted to labor organizations under the
Clayton Act, to see that antitrust law is governed by a complex set of
goals.120

Moreover, no specific economic theory has captured antitrust
law. The basic elements of a story we have watched unfold in other
areas of the law 121 has occurred in antitrust: strenuous attacks on
Warren Court era jurisprudence led to initially successful but
ultimately incomplete attempts to provide a coherent, general
theoretical grounding. The Chicago school's important successes did
not prove robust enough to gather anything approaching consensus in
the courts or academia. Indeed, by the late 1980s, leading antitrust
scholars hostile to the Chicago school had hammered out a set of
118. Id. at 187-88 (citations omitted).
119. O'MALLEY, GRENIG & LEE. FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 150.01
(5th ed. 2000).
120. See, e.g., Prof'I Real Estate Inventors, Inc. v. Columbia Picture Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49,
56-57 (1993).
121. See Allen & Rosenberg, supra note 5.
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basic criticisms of the school and began predicting its demise. At
approximately the same time, the price-theoretic structure of the
Chicago school came under a profound attack; the movement of
economic theory outside the law began to be picked up by legal
theorists. It pointed in directions which presented serious alternatives to the Chicago school position on efficiency and post-Chicago
theorists began using a variety of approaches to model, among other
things, the effect of informational deficiencies on antitrust rules.122 In
somewhat of a parallel course, populist-oriented antitrust scholars
drew from international law, particularly from the European Union, a
new source of strength that the notion of free competition embodied
in antitrust law included principles of fairness and substantive
justice.123 Legislatures and courts have not adopted the position of
one or another of these camps; they have adopted an overwhelmingly
microeconomic approach to antitrust.124
The growing importance of microeconomic analysis to antitrust
law provides an interesting counterpoint to the resistance of negligence law to microeconomics. We begin by illustrating the progressive influence of microeconomics on a range of Sherman Act jury
instructions. Then we turn to section 1 Sherman Act Rule of Reason
instructions because of the rough analogue they provide to tort law's
reasonable prudent person standard. Both examples provide
important evidence that microeconomics has colonized Sherman Act
jurisprudence in a gradual but thorough manner.
A.

Selected Sherman Act Jury Instructions

The influence of economics on antitrust jury instructions over the
past eighty years has been marked. Herbert Hovenkamp and
Frederick Rowe have previously demonstrated that economics
models have strongly influenced antitrust law at least since the
122. See Peter J. Hammer, Antitrust Beyond Competition: Market Failures, Total Welfare,
and the Challenge ofIntramarket Second-Best Tradeoffs, 98 MICH. L. REV. 849, 854 n.12 (2000)
(citing Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 213, 241-42
(1985) ("Problems of second-best may be so overwhelming and so hypothetical that the
antitrust policymaker is well off to avoid them.")); PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, 2
ANTITRUST LAW 308-13 (1978) (also acknowledging second-best concerns).
123. See, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox, The Battle for the Soul of Antitrust, 75 CAL. L. REV. 917
(1987).
124. This point is made clear by the controversy which attends the seemingly endless
interpretative effort concerning the Court's recent antitrust opinions to provide evidence of a
direct endorsement of one program or the other. See, e.g., Thomas C. Arthur, A Workable Rule
of Reason: A Less Ambitious Antitrust Rule for the Federal Courts, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 337
(2000).
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1930s.125 We take it to be no great surprise that jury instructions have
tracked this trend.
In order to indicate the depth of the effect on antitrust law of
microeconomic theory in a manageable fashion, we focus on two sets
of jury instructions. First we present typical price-fixing instructions,
both horizontal and vertical. Along with cartels, price fixing is a core
antitrust concept under the Sherman Act. The significance of these
instructions is that they display an explicit tendency to require juries
to consider many different economic methods of fixing prices. While
this is obviously an intuitive approach to drafting a price-fixing
instruction, this tendency to define in detail what constitutes price
fixing in economic terms has changed over time. In the last thirty
years, price-fixing instructions have become far more rigorous in their
description of the methods of price fixing.
Second, we examine jury instruction defining monopoly as an
example of the impact of economics on specific areas of antitrust law.
One striking aspect of the history of these instructions is the pronounced tendency to focus the attention of the jury on the market
share of the defendant. Over the last forty years, at least, market
share has assumed greater importance and juries have been instructed
to look at a longer list of facts from which to induce market share.
First, price fixing. We begin with a typical price-fixing instruction from the 1920s:
We are naturally led to inquire as to what is the character of
the agreement or understanding charged which the Government
claims was in violation of the Sherman law, or, on the other hand,
what was the character of the conduct of the members of this combination which it claims brands that combination as illegal under
the Sherman law. On this head, first and most important, let me
advise you, so that there cannot be any possible misunderstanding
in your minds that it is illegal and a violation of the Sherman law
for a group of independent units, that is, individuals or corporations, operating in combination such as a trade association of the
character shown here, to agree amongst themselves to fix the prices
to be charged for the commodity which the members manufacture,
where they control a substantial part of the interstate trade and
commerce in that commodity. That proposition you should bear
clearly in mind .... 126

125. See Frederick M. Rowe, The Decline of Antitrust and the Delusions of Models: The
Faustian Pact of Law and Economics, 72 GEO. L.J. 1511 (1984); Hovenkamp, supra note 122.
126.

AM. BAR ASS'N, JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL ANTITRUST CASES 7 (1965) (citing

United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., Cr. 32-566 (S.D.N.Y. 1922)).
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This is an obvious, direct instruction. Perhaps for this reason it
remained durable through the 1950s. By the 1960s, however, a more
complicated instruction became typical:
Thus, any direct interference by contract, or combination, or
conspiracy, with the ordinary and usual competitive pricing system
of the open market constitutes an unreasonable restraint of trade,
and is in itself unlawful. The mere fact that there may be business
justifications for the fixing of prices, or the fact that the wholly or
partially fixed prices may be reasonable, will not relieve the members of the price-fixing combination or conspiracy from liability under the antitrust laws.
On the other hand, the mere fact that pricing systems of persons engaged in the same business or industry may be substantially
similar does not, in and of itself, indicate a price-fixing combination
or conspiracy, but may be consistent with ordinary competitive behavior in a free and open market.
If you find from the evidence in these cases that the defendants, or two or more of them, have knowingly and willfully agreed
or conspired, whether tacitly or expressly, to raise, lower, maintain
or standardize admission prices, or have attempted to regulate or
control or fix admission prices in any way or manner, or by any
means or method,127
you must find that such defendants have violated
the antitrust laws.
The shift from the earlier instruction that forbids an agreement
"to fix the prices to be charged for the commodity which the members manufacture, where they control a substantial part of the
interstate trade and commerce in that commodity," to one referring
to "competitive pricing systems of the open market" and "ordinary
competitive behavior in a free and open market" is striking, and, we
suspect, evidence of the effect of microeconomics.
The current ABA sample jury instructions on horizontal price
fixing and vertical minimum resale price fixing continue this process:
Plaintiff claims that it was injured because defendants conspired to fix the prices for [productX].
Under the Sherman Act it is illegal for two or more competitors to enter into an agreement to fix, control, raise, lower, maintain, or stabilize the prices charged or to be charged for products or
services. This prohibition is violated not only if the same price is
set by competitors, but also if the range or level of prices is agreed
upon or various price formulas are agreed upon. Any agreement to
[describe the price-fixing conspiracy alleged by plaintiff,e.g., to set a
specific price, to maintain a floor underprices to increase the stability
or firmness of prices, to establish a minimum or maximum price, to
127. AM. BAR Ass'N. ANTITRUST CIVIL JURY INSTRUCrIONS 69-70 (1972).
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eliminate or limit discounts, to establish a fixed spread between the
prices of different sellers, to establish a fixed spread between wholesale and retail prices, to establish fixed markups or profit margins, to
stabilize prices, to set credit terms or other conditions of sale relation
to price] is illegal.
To win against a defendant on its price-fixing claim, plaintiff
must have proved as to that defendant each of the following elements by a preponderance of the evidence:
First, that an agreement to fix the prices of [productX1 existed;
Second, that that defendant knowingly-that is, voluntarily
and intentionally-became a party to that agreement;
Third, that such agreement occurred in or affected interstate
[or foreign] commerce;
Fourth, that the agreement caused plaintiff to suffer an injury
28
to its business or property.l
The microeconomic aspect of these price-fixing instructions is
plain, and again appear to demonstrate an increasing utilization of
microeconomic concepts and jargon.
We turn now to the definition of a monopoly under section 2 of
the Sherman Act, which has not always included reference to even
such a basic economic concept as market shares. Thus, a typical
instruction from the 1930s runs:
[I]t does not have to be that these people were in complete control
of the fur dressing industry. It is enough if there is a substantial
control, whereby these people could fix their prices among each
other and determine who was going to enter into this business
within a limit. That would constitute a monopoly, even though not
a complete domination by the group of particular activities.1 29
By the late 1950s, explicit discussions of the effect of size on monopoly claims began to find their way into jury instructions. Thus:
Now let me direct your attention back to the defining of "monopolization." It is a series of restraint of trade. The term does not
necessarily mean complete acquisition or control of the market in a
particular community, or the exclusion of all competition. The size
of a corporation, or the percentage of the market it controls are not
by themselves indicators of a violation of the antitrust laws. However, these factors can indicate the degree or power which a corporation has in the competitive market and they can indicate the
ability to exercise such power within the relevant market. If there
is power to control or dominate such market, to exclude actual or
128. AM. BAR ASS'N, SAMPLE JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL ANTITRUST CASES, at B-16-B17 (1999).
129. AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 126, at 80-81 (citing United States v. Fur Dressers Factor
Corp., Cr. C-95-924 (S.D.N.Y. 1933)).
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potential competitors therefrom, or to otherwise unreasonably suppress competition therein, this is sufficient to constitute monopolization under the antitrust laws.30
By the 1970s, explicit descriptions of market share became commonplace:
Monopoly power is defined in the law as the power to control
prices or exclude competition. Now, the existence of monopoly
power ordinarily may be inferred from the fact that a company has
the predominant share of the market. However, when a company
does not possess a predominant share of the market, monopoly
power cannot be inferred. The test is whether the defendant has
the power to control prices or exclude competition. Furthermore,
the size of the company alone is not monopoly power, but is only a
factor which may be considered in determining whether or not a
defendant possessed that power. However, both of these factors
(1) the size of the company, and, (2) the percentage of the market it
controls, may be considered as indicators as to the degree of power
which a company has to control prices and exclude competition.
It is, of course, natural that some businesses grow larger than
others, and, therefore, operate and sell on a much larger scale than
a smaller competitor. In determining whether or not Bethlehem
possessed monopoly power you may also consider the existence
and proximity of other competitors in the relevant market, the responsiveness of the alleged possessor of such power to the pricing
policies of those competitors or potential competitors and the possibility that others, not now competing, may enter the market. You
may also consider the economic and commercial realities of the industry involved. Monopoly power to exist need not be exercised
and it need not be absolute in the potential for market control
which it gives to its possessor. If within the relevant market a company has then power to control prices or to exclude competitors
then that company possesses monopoly power within the meaning
of the antitrust laws.131
Quite clearly, microeconomic analysis informs these instructions.
Indeed, to some extent they represent an invitation for the jury to
defer to a cluster of economic concepts, such as relevant markets, and
to expert testimony about the markets in question. The current ABA
sample instruction continues this trend:
Monopoly power is the power to control prices in or to exclude
competition from the relevant market.
The power to control prices is the power of a company to establish appreciably higher prices for its goods than those charged by
130. AM. BAR ASS'N, ANTITRUST CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 103 (1965) (citing Park

Neponset Corp. v. Smith, 258 F.2d 452 (1st Cir. 1958)).
131.

AM. BAR ASS'N, ANTITRUST CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 132 (1980) (citing Belmont

Indus., Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 512 F.2d 434 (3d Cir. 1975)).
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competitors for equivalent goods without a substantial loss of business to competitors. Thus, if a company that has raised prices eventually has to lower its prices to the level of prices charged by its
competitors, it may not have monopoly power in the sense of power
to control prices.
The power to exclude competition means the power of a company to dominate a market by eliminating existing competition
from that market or by preventing new competition from entering
the market.
To establish the possession of monopoly power, plaintiff need
not prove that prices were raised or that competition actually was
excluded, but only that defendant had the power to raise prices or
exclude competition.
Further, to conclude that defendant had monopoly power, you
need not find that defendant could sell at any price it desired or
that it had no competition whatsoever. A company may face some
competition in the relevant market and still have monopoly power.
On the other hand, if you find that defendant did not have the
power to control prices or to exclude competition, then you must
conclude that it did not have monopoly power. 132
B.

Rule of Reason Jury Instructions

The Rule of Reason provides a particularly suitable test for the
influence of microeconomic analysis on antitrust. Across the
spectrum of antitrust law, it stands out as involving an unusually
complex and ambiguous inquiry. Undoubtedly, this is because it
entails, at the most general level, an analysis of "whether the restraint
imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes
competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy
competition."133 Despite a long history of refinement, tinkering and
outright overhaul by the courts, it remains "an incredibly complicated
and prolonged economic investigation" that is "often wholly fruitless
when undertaken."134 Somewhat less charitably, a fair number of
practicing lawyers regard it as a "euphemism for an endless economic
inquiry resulting in a defense verdict."135 We find it interesting
because its application invites a complex, fact-intense, and, to some, a
standardless inquiry, which provides a rough analogy to the reasonableness standards at the core of negligence.
132. AM. BAR Ass'N, supra note 128, at C-4 (citations omitted).
133. Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
134. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
135. Maxwell M. Blecher, Schwinn -An Example of a Genuine Commitment to Antitrust
Law, 44 ANTITRUsT L.J. 550, 553 (1975).
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Such complexity has driven the adoption of the large set of
precedents that cabin the scope of the rule in one way or the other. It
was not until the 1970s that the "comprehensive network" of per se
rules which served to limit the application of the Rule of Reason was
decisively pared back by the Supreme Court. Shortly after opening
the door to more vigorous application of the Rule of Reason, the
Court began developing the doctrinal support for truncated applications of the rule, the so-called "quick look" or "flexible" Rule of
Reason analysis. Predictably, no coherent theory has emerged from
this process; instead a collection of more or less disparate standards
that govern specific types of behavior has emerged. In the words of
two astute practitioners, the rule has evolved "from rigid categories to
flexible 'common sense'; from rules of law to rules of thumb."136
Views on the worth of this process are mixed; some see it as optimal,
others as evidence that antitrust is adrift. We are, of course, agnostic
on this point.
We are not agonistic on the accelerating pace of the colonization
of Rule of Reason jury instructions by microeconomic analysis in the
late 1970s. While we cannot put a specific date on this matter, an
examination of Rule of Reason jury instructions shows that courts
began in the 1970s to move microeconomic considerations to the
forefront when instructing juries. This process continued through the
heyday of the Chicago School and instructions from recent cases and
the ABA Model Instructions are based foursquare on microeconomic
concerns. We turn now to examples.
For some eighty-odd years, the basic statement of Rule of Reason analysis has remained that of Mr. Justice Brandeis in Board of
Trade of Chicago v. United States:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as
merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or
whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To
determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts
peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the
restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all
relevant facts. This is not because a good intention will save an
otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because

136. Willard K. Tom & Chul Pak, Toward a Flexible Rule of Reason, 68 ANTITRUST L.J.
391,391 (2000).
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knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to

predict consequences....

137

Justice Brandeis's formulation of the Rule of Reason left its im-

print on jury instructions in two principal ways. First, juries were
asked to assess the competitive significance of the restraint at hand,

and second, they were invited to base their assessment upon a now
standard list of facts relevant to the restraint and the parties. Thus, a
typical jury instruction from the 1960s echoes Justice Brandeis's
statement of the rule by inviting juries to examine the specific context
of a restraint:
As to the meaning of the term "restraint of trade," you are instructed that this general term applies only to unreasonable restraints and not to all possible restraints of trade. The antitrust law
seeks to maintain free competition in interstate commerce, in order
to protect the public interest. The end sought by the antitrust law is
the prevention of unreasonable restraints in business and commercial transactions which tend to restrict production, raise prices, or
otherwise control or affect the market to the detriment of purchasers or consumers of goods and services; the public is to be protected
in order to secure to them the advantages which accrue to them
from free competition in the market....
Not all restraints of trade are unreasonable restraints. All
business affects trade in some way. Therefore, in determining
whether a "restraint of trade" exists, you must decide whether the
conduct which you have found tends to restrict or otherwise control
free and open competition. And in determining whether or not
such an unreasonable restraint exists, you need not find a specific
injury, but you must find that the conduct tends to or is reasonably
138
calculated to prejudice the public interest.
Clearly, both Justice Brandeis's statement of the rule and this
jury instruction rely heavily on microeconomic concepts. Both enjoin
the fact finder to focus on the competitive effects of a restraint and to
develop that assessment through economic calculations. Nonetheless,
there is an important difference between these two formulations of
the rule: the jury instruction asks jurors to assess the restraint in terms
of public interest. Obviously, this is a fairly supple imperative, and it
is by no means clear that microeconomics and the public interest
coincide on antitrust policy.
The instruction and Justice Brandeis's formulation of the rule do
share a fairly capacious list of factors for the jury to consider.

137. Bd. of Trade of Chi., 246 U.S. at 238.
138. AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 131, at 91 (emphasis added) (citing Dailey v. Quality Sch.
Plan, Inc. 380 F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1967)).
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Perhaps jurors would read into that list an assessment of the public
interest. Because of a lack of data on how juries decide antitrust
cases (or other cases) we cannot say; we are trapped at the level of
the instruction. At the level of the wording, it is palpably clear that
putting in the words "public interest" matters. Moreover, the very
looseness of the list of factors Justice Brandeis included in his
statement of the rule points out another reason the term "public
interest" is significant.
Justice Brandeis's statement does not explain how a fact finder
should balance the positive and negative effects of a restraint.
Indeed, it is unclear if a fact finder must balance the positives and
negatives, although a certain invitation to balancing is implicit in his
words. All of the same may be said of the jury instruction. What is
significant for our purposes is that the weak message sent on the
balancing issue may reinforce the tendency of a juror to include his
own perception of the public interest or antitrust policy.
By the 1980s, Rule of Reason instructions went through two
transformations. They began dropping references to the public
interest and they began to set explicit tests for measuring competitive
effects. While Justice Brandeis's list of factors remained, they began
to play an equal role with the imperative to find an unreasonable
restraint of trade only if the competitive harm of a restraint outweighed, or according to some courts, substantially outweighed, the
benefits of a restraint. Thus, a typical instruction from the 1980s
reads:
In determining reasonableness there are three crucial inquiries
you must make. First, you must determine whether [the defendant]
has substantial market power to unreasonably restrain trade in the
relevant market. Second, you must determine the effect of the restrictions on competition. Third, you must consider the justifications for imposing the restrictions.
Now, as I just told you, the first inquiry you must make is to
determine whether [the defendant] has substantial power to unreasonably restrain trade in the relevant market....
If... you find that [the defendant] has substantial power to
unreasonably restrain trade in the relevant market, you must then
judge whether the restriction is unreasonable in its effect on competition. In other words, you must determine whether the restrictions
employed constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade because
they had an overall anticompetitive effect in the relevant market.
In other words, a restriction may reduce or diminish competition in some respects and at the very same time enhance or increase
competition in other respects. For example, a restriction may re-
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duce intrabrand competition but at the same time increase interbrand competition. If you find that the restrictions in this case do
impose some adverse restraint on competition which is more than
trivial, and if you also find to exist procompetitive effects, then you
must determine whether the anticompetitive effects of those restrictions outweigh the procompetitive effects. If they do not, you
should conclude that [defendant's] restriction is reasonable under
the law....
You must decide what the "purpose" of the alleged restraints
was. You must also consider the "effect" of the alleged restraints. ...
In order for you to find that [the defendant's] restrictions are
unreasonable, you must be convinced that [the plaintiff] has proven
by a preponderance of the evidence that the restrictions are anticompetitive in effect. [The defendant's] purpose in imposing the
restrictions, by itself, is not sufficient to establish a violation of the
Rule of Reason, although proof of purpose may help you assess the
market impact of [the defendant's] restrictions. Absent anticompetitive effect, an unlawful intent or purpose is not enough to
establish a Rule of Reason violation.
The focus of your inquiry must be the effect that [the defendant's] restrictions have on competition. The antitrust laws are designed to protect competition generally, not to protect any one
competitor. Therefore, in making your determination of whether
these restrictions constituted an unreasonable restraint on trade,
you are not being asked to determine the effects of the restrictions
on [the plaintiff.] A manufacturer or supplier, such as [the defendant], has a legitimate interest in the way its product is sold, and it
may legally refuse to sell to any particular dealer....
The standard of reasonableness has a particular meaning in the
law. To determine the reasonableness of [the defendant's] system,
you are not to make a business judgment about whether [the defendant] has chosen the best system of distribution, or the one
which you would have chosen had it been up to you. You are simply to determine whether this system is reasonable or unreasonable
in its effect on competition.
In making your determination of whether the restrictions [the
defendant] imposed on its distributors constituted a reasonable or
unreasonable restraint of trade, you may consider whether the restrictions were reasonably necessary to meet the evil believed to
exist prior to imposing the restrictions.
You may find that [the defendant] could have solved these
problems by imposing other types of restrictions which might have
been less restrictive than the system actually adopted by [the defendant]. The existence of less restrictive alternatives is relevant in
determining whether the restrictions used were reasonably necessary....
In the final analysis, you must determine the following:
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(1) Whether intrabrand competition is affected by the restrictions;
(2) Whether interbrand competition is affected by the restrictions;
(3) Balancing both these factors, to what extent is competition affected; in other words is there an overall procompetitive or
an overall anticompetitive effect.
If you find that on balance competition is either enhanced or
remains unaffected, then you would find the restrictions reasonable. If you find that on balance competition is harmed, that is, that
the anticompetitive effects outweigh the procompetitive effects,
then you would find the restrictions unreasonable.1 39
The most recent American Bar Association Model Instruction,
the model presented in treatises and case law, supports a hard
microeconomic approach to the Rule of Reason. The American Bar
Association Model Instruction reads:
Plaintiff challenges the practice of defendant [describe practice,
e.g., to allocate territorialmarket areasfor its distributors]. To win
on this claim, plaintiff must show that this practice was an unreasonable restraint of trade.
In determining whether the restraint was unreasonable, you
must decide whether the restraint helped competition or harmed
competition. Your task is to balance any aspects of the restraint
that were helpful to competition against any aspects that were
harmful to it. In doing so, you should consider such factors as the
particular business of defendant; the condition of the market before
and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and
its effect on competition; the history of the restraint; the reason for
adopting the restraint; and defendant's purpose or intent.
To show that the restraint was unreasonable, plaintiff must
prove that defendant's activities substantially harmed competition
in a relevant market. To show this, plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence:
First, what the relevant market is;
Second, that defendant's restraint or practice had a substantially harmful effect on competition in that relevant market; and

139. AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 131, at S-19-S-20 (citing Davis-Watkins Co. v. Serv.
Merch., 686 F.2d 1190 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 931 (1984)). These changes in
antitrust instructions reflect the relevant case law. In 1977, the Court held, in the context of an
antitrust challenge to the National Society of Engineers canons of ethics, that "[c]ontrary to its
name, the Rule does not open the field of antitrust inquiry to any argument in favor of a
challenged restraint that may fall within the realm of reason." Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v.
United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978). Rather, according to the Court, the Rule "focuses
directly on the challenged restraint's impact on competitive conditions." Id.
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Third, that the harmful effect on competition outweighs any
beneficial effect on competition.140
The overall picture presented by the changes in Rule of Reason
instructions is striking. Juries have been reined in by mandates to
balance harms and to focus on specific markets, practices, and
products. Language that would encourage the jury to analyze the
public welfare aspects of antitrust has been reduced if not deleted
altogether. Significantly, while the instructions do not focus the
explicit attention of the jury on efficiency, the range of issues left for
the jury to analyze and the emphasis placed on balancing harms and
competitive injury indicates that efficiency is an imperative. Nonetheless, what is most important for our purposes is the change over
time; Rule of Reason instructions have become closely knit microeconomic blueprints. By contrast, negligence instructions have
remained virtually constant over the last century.
CONCLUSION

Antitrust apparently has been colonized; negligence does not
appear to have been. The economic scholars probably got one right,
and they probably got one wrong. 4' The contributions of the
corrective justice scholars to torts is perhaps somewhat more
ambiguous, but the evidence indicates its irrelevancy. One area
plausibly is subject to top-down theorizing; one is not.
As we said in the introduction to this Article, we presently make
no claim about the extension of our analysis. The primary contribution here is to make plausible that legal phenomena (human interactions and resultant legal regulation) may be analyzed systematically
(top-down theory though that may be), more important usefully, and
most important not just by reference to competing ideologies of
lawmakers (whether judicial or legislative).142 To us it is significant

140. AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 128, at A-4-A-5.
141. For an analysis of another one the economists got "wrong" that bears a small
resemblance to the interests of this Article, see Karen Eggleston, Eric A. Posner & Richard
Zeckhauser, The Design and Interpretation of Contracts: Why Complexity Matters. 95 Nw. U. L.
REV. 91 (2000).
142. This seems to be the standard explanation for the lack of systematicity in the law.
[T]he lack of system in the existing law is not due merely to the existing lawmaker's
paying insufficient attention to systematicity. It is due primarily to the fact that
modern legal systems are open to change at the hands of different lawmakers, with
differing and often opposed priorities, programs, and values.
Jeremy Waldron, "TranscendentalNonsense" and System in the Law. 100 COLUM. L. REV. 16,

41-42 (2000). Surely some legal phenomena are so explained; we have tried to show that some
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that the data are consistent with our theoretical predictions in two
analogous fields that have been of interest to economists (one of
which has also been of interest to corrective justice theorists). This is
because one economist-Richard Posner-has claimed that the
charge of ineffectuality can be made of moral theorizing but not of
economic (and other "scientific") theorizing.14 3 The data presented
here indicate that he is half right-some moral theorizing is apparently of little practical consequence to the legal system-and half
wrong-sometimes economic theorizing, including the centerpiece of
economic theorizing, is of little practical consequence to the legal
system. More important, our data suggest that Judge Posner's
(implicit) explanation is quite wrong. It is not, or not just, that much
moral theorizing is comprised of half-baked ideas promoted by
hypocritical postmodern types whose only real interest is pursuing
their personal and ideological agendas, and that economics by
contrast is a science pursued disinterestedly by hardheaded realists.
Instead, it is at least in part that some realms of legal regulation are
more amenable than others to being organized by reference to simple
theories, and that legal theorists may have neglected this point. 144
We thus think that not only is Judge Posner wrong in part, so too
is one of his critics, Charles Fried, with respect to the significance of
philosophy for the law.145 In an arresting metaphor, Fried wrote:
The picture I have, then, is of philosophy proposing an elaborate structure of arguments and considerations which descend from
on high but stop some twenty feet above the ground. It is the peculiar task of the law to complete this structure of ideals and values,
to bring it down to earth; to complete it so that it is seated firmly
and concretely and shelters real human beings against the storms of
are not. They are explained instead by being too ambiguous or unpredictable to be confined by
a "system."
143. Posner, supra note 2; Richard A. Posner. On the Alleged "Sophistication" of Academic
Moralism, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 1017 (2000).
144. One of the difficulties with Posner's argument is, as Jeremy Waldron, Ego-Bloated
Hovel, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 597, 616 (2000), argues, that "in order to sustain his main thesis, he
would need an alternative strategy to show that the sort of argumentation offered by thinkers
like Rawls and Dworkin on matters of public policy is as inconclusive and inefficacious in court
and in politics as it evidently is in academia." Exactly, which is what we are trying to provide in
part. We see the recent work by Daniel A. Farber, Do Theories of Statutory Interpretation
Matter? A Case Study. 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 1409 (2000), in which he presents evidence suggesting
that they do not matter very much, as providing support for our more general thesis. The
reason theories of statutory interpretation do not matter much is that the reality of statutes and
the problems posed are complex, not simple, and thus that simple theories would be
inappropriate. They are consequently, and sensibly, ignored by the judges, even the judges
espousing the theories.
145. Charles Fried, Philosophy Matters, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1739 (1998).
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passion and conflict. That last twenty feet may not be the most
glamorous part of the building-it is the part where the plumbing
and utilities are housed. But it is an indispensable part. The lofty
philosophical edifice does not determine what the last twenty feet
are, yet if the legal foundation is to support the whole, then ideals
and values must constrain, limit, inform, and inspire the foundation-but no more. The law really is an independent, distinct part
of the structure of value. 146

While purportedly explaining the independent significance of the
law, the condescension in this passage is striking. It is not the law
hovering majestically over philosophers who, in their petty squabbles,
are struggling to be heard; rather, it is the philosopher (kings?) with
their arguments "which descend from on high." Dworkin has an
equally high opinion of jurisprudes, describing them as the "princes"
of "law's empire," but not its "seers and prophets."47 Posner has his
privileged class as well.14 8 Without getting into a battle of metaphors,
we have tried to show not that law's royalty, of whatever kind, does
not have much of an impact on any aspect of the field, but rather to
begin the process of specifying why and when the theorists might
matter. Or why and when different kinds of theory might matter. 149
146. Charles Fried, The Artificial Reason of the Law or. What Lawyers Know, 60 TEX. L.
REV. 35,57 (1981).
147. DWORKIN, supra note 7. at 407.
148. Even within what Posner could classify as "science," though, analogous debates about
the utility of generalization proceed rather robustly. Compare EDWARD 0. WILSON,
CONSILIENCE: THE UNITY OF KNOWLEDGE (1998), with Jerry Fodor, Look!, LONDON REV.
BOOKS, Oct. 10, 1998, at 3; compare EVELYN Fox KELLER, THE CENTURY OF THE GENE
(2000). with John Maynard Smith, The Cheshire Cat's DNA, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Dec. 21, 2000,
at 43; see also MARGARET MORRISON, UNIFYING SCIENTIFIC THEORIES (2000) (arguing that
the urge to simplify and unify, while important to science, plays a considerably more muted role
than is conventionally believed). For an argument that the inability to generalize, to provide a
top-down theory for, American constitutional law is a good thing see PHILIP BOBBITT,
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991). We hasten to add that we are not making
normative claims in this Article.
149. Thus, our argument differs significantly from Posner's attack on academic moralizing.
See Posner, supra note 2. We are trying to discern the nature of legal phenomena that permit or
invite one form of inquiry and explanation rather than another. A priori, we have no good
reason to assert that academic moralizing of the Posnerian kind could never influence the
outcomes in or accurately explain a set of legal phenomena (although we suspect the set of such
sets is small, but still it is an empirical question). Analogously, and this is the point that Posner
may miss, a priori one should be cautious about thinking that any set of legal phenomena is
amenable to top-down theorizing of any kind. Perhaps Posner would not disagree, as there is
some ambiguity in his writing. In Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1998),
he states that "The big problem is not lack of theory, but lack of knowledge .. " In Reply to
Critics of the Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1796, 1803 (1998), he
says, "Consensus on ends or goals is found in some areas of law, but not in all." And at page
1811 he says that "judges routinely confront issues that cannot be resolved by the application of
an algorithm ....
Precisely, and we are trying to uncover whether one can specify the nature of
such cases. Thus, perhaps Charles Fried is right that sometimes Philosophy Matters,supra note
145-we would like some purchase on when or why. In any event, we are not interested here in
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an intellectual history of any particular thinker, but we do wish to note that Posner's comments
quoted above seem to us somewhat at odds with an apparently stronger commitment to
algorithms in Richard A. Posner, Legal Reasoningfrom the Top Down and from the Bottom Up:
The Question of Unenumerated Rights, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 433, 435, 436 (1992) ("1 agree there
isn't much to bottom-up reasoning" and "there must be a theory"). The strong position baffles
us, both because it is inconsistent with obvious observations of the human condition and for
formal reasons, such as: what is the theory from which the necessity for a theory is deduced: and
where did that theory come from? In any event, much of life, including legal life, involves
muddling through, and we hope we have said something useful, even if obviously preliminary,
about the nature of muddling.

